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U.S. PLANNING 16 OCT NUCLEAR TEST BLAST

LD150025 Moscow TASS in English 0015 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 14 TASS -- The Reagan administration, in challenging American public opinion and all sober-minded people on earth, intends to detonate another nuclear device shortly. The explosion, code-named Belmont, was slated for Thursday morning, October 16, Ms. Crescent of the Rocky Mountain Peace Center said to TASS correspondent Antoliy Lazarev. It will be conducted in sector 20 at the Nevada test site. She emphasized that six American anti-war campaigners (Amy Milhouser, 24, Beverly Lyne, 35, Steve Smith, 34, John Seward, 26, Mike Geare, 30, and Charlie Hiflenaus, 37) today sneaked inside the test area. According to Crescent, the objective of these courageous people was to try and hinder the testing.

Belmont will become the 22nd nuclear weapon test (counting the explosions that went unannounced by Washington), conducted by the United States since the Soviet Union introduced its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. News analysts do not rule out the possibility that the blast is linked with Ronald Reagan's "star wars" programme. U.S. anti-war activists are planning protest demonstrations near the gate of the nuclear test range to demand that the Reagan administration stop nuclear tests and join the Soviet moratorium.

U.S. SCIENTISTS SPEAK ON DANGERS OF SDI

LD130855 Moscow TASS in English 0807 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] San Francisco October 13 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yuriy Algunov reports:

The Strategic Defence Initiative of the U.S. Administration leads to the aggravation of the international situation and poses a grave threat to mankind. This conclusion was drawn by participants in a theoretical conference on SDI at the Berkeley campus of the University of California. During the three days of debates many well-known American scientists, politicians and public figures stressed that the task of averting the nuclear arms race in space had new acquired special importance. Most of the speeches at the conference were keynoted by the idea that it was necessary to look for ways to accelerate progress on arms control. The more real and prompt way of doing away with the nuclear threat is not SDI, as the President tries to prove, but a total ban on nuclear testing which is being called for by the Soviet Union, Congressman George Brown said.

It is only the Soviet "star peace" programme and the joint exploration of space for civilian purposes that offers the sole sensible alternative to the nuclear space ventures planned by the White House, one of the organisers of the conference, physics Professor John Halloren of University of California, said. Growing rivalry in outer space, Professor Jerry Sunders added, is fraught with the depletion of the world's natural resources and the aggravation of global ecological problems. Some SDI proponents, among them employees of military laboratories and centres, also addressed the conference, convened by the Federation of American Scientists and the Physicians for Social Responsibility. Yet the forum clearly demonstrated that most American scientists have made their choice in favour of peace.

'BACK-TO-FRONT' U.S. ARGUMENTS ON MORATORIUM HIT

PM131145 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 86 First Edition p 3

[A. Lyutyy "Pertinent Notes": "Back-to-Front Arguments"]

[Text] Robert Gale, the U.S. medic who became world famous thanks to his noble assistance to the victims of the Chernobyl AES accident, said at a recent Las Vegas press conference: "The radiation resulting from the Chernobyl accident was just one-tenth of the radiation which arises after the detonation of the smallest nuclear device. Bear in mind that we were operating in optimum conditions. There were more than enough doctors and the hospitals were unharmed. But what would happen during a nuclear war? Chernobyl has yet again refuted those who hope to survivi a nuclear war." Moving to the topic of nuclear test, Gale bitterly felt that such tests are "contra-indicated by people's health."

U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger did not attend the press conference. And not only because he is probably no admirer of Gale's talents. Weinberger does not believe that nuclear tests in the United States are harmful for his health. Moreover, the secretary is profoundly convinced that not only the physical but political and moral health of the entire country would be considerably strengthened if the United States continued to explode ever larger charges at the underground test site in Nevada. The Pentagon boss preaches a clear creed with regard to military-political strategy: "More, more, and still more." More billions for the arms race, more of the latest first-strike systems. And, finally, more nuclear tests.

The longer the Soviet Union observes its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, the more powerful will be the wave of public feelings in the United States favoring the moratorium and the more uncomfortable Weinberger will feel. He has repeatedly vented his emotions on this score, and with increasing frequency recently. Weinberger is now aiming his ire mainly at Congress, which -- oh, how sinful! -- has dared to oppose the administration's stand on the nuclear test issue. As is well known, the Senate voted for the United States to conclude a nuclear test ban agreement and the House of Representatives advocated banning nuclear tests yielding more than 1 kiloton as of 1 January 1987. For Weinberger this is tantamount to a betrayal of national interests. In a letter sent to Congress the other day the Pentagon leader stated that such bans "undermine the reliability of our deterrence forces and postpone, possibly for an unlimited period, our persistent efforts" in the direction of arms limitation and reduction.

The U.S. defense secretary's message is more than dubious, to put it mildly. For it is far simpler to strive for nuclear arms limitation and reduction by merely ending tests and thereby removing the possibility of improving these weapons. However, it is this that the Pentagon opposes. "Nuclear weapons tests," Weinberger wrote bluntly to Congress, "are of decisive importance for ensuring the security and safekeeping of our warheads and weapons systems." In other words, Weinberger and his soul mates are planning not to eliminate but to retain and augment nuclear arsenals. At any rate, the talk about willingness to curb the arms race is not backed up by real action.

It is already obvious that there is no real foundation to a number of arguments which have already been put forward by Washington for several months now to justify its reluctance to join in the Soviet moratorium. Let us return, for instance, to Weinberger's statement about the need to maintain the reliability and safekeeping of U.S. nuclear warheads.

Including the recent "Labquark" nuclear test, the United States has carried out 21 nuclear explosions in Nevada since the USSR introduced the moratorium on 6 August last year. Have they all really been carried out in order to ensure that U.S. nuclear arsenals are reliable and secure? At this juncture it is apposite to cite the opinion of Tom Wicker, one of the best-known U.S. observers. "When," Wicker points out, "the White House insists that the United States needs to continue testing in order to check the reliability of existing weapons, even those Americans who support the administration must ask why the Soviet Union does not need to carry out tests to check reliability? And why will only a few Americans admit that most scientists -- including Norris Bradbury, former director of the Los Almos nuclear laboratory -- believe that there is no need to hold tests for checking purposes? For the United States tests new weapons 10-15 times a year on average, while explosions for checking purposes are held less than once a year."

Nor does the argument that the Soviet Union has held more nuclear tests, and the United States consequently has to catch up stand up to examination. A report recently published by the Center for Defense Information organization in Washington points out that as of August 1986 the United States had held 828 nuclear tests and the Soviet Union had held 604.

Another pseudo-argument is the statement that the moratorium on nuclear explosions cannot be effectively verified [kontrolivorat]. President Nixon once said that it was quite possible for a ban to be "adequately verified [proverka]" and since then national verification [kontrol] means have become much more sophisticated and reliable. "Practically all nongovernmental seismographic specialists," THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "believe that verification [proverka] of the observance of the ban can be guaranteed." The joint experiment by Soviet and U.S. seismologists in the Semipalatinsk region is weighty proof of this. The U.S. scientists were able to monitor [kontrolivorat] tremors in direct proximity to the Soviet nuclear test range. It is worth noting that when the U.S. seismologists invited their Soviet colleagues to the region of the Nevada test range to carry out similar measurements, the State Department imposed a number of clearly artificial conditions with the aim of wrecking the trip.

Recently there have been increasingly frequent statements in the United States to the effect that it is necessary initially to reach an agreement on redcuing nuclear arms, and only subsequently to ban nuclear explosions. This thesis was debunked in a recent conversation of mine with William Fulbright, one of the best-known U.S. politicians and formerly chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. "That argument is back to front," he said. "What could be more effective than a nuclear test ban which would initially slow and then freeze the process of improving nuclear weapons? What could be better than this prerequisite for subsequent reductions in nuclear arsenals?"

There are other "back-to-front arguments" currently being cited in Washington. They all bear witness not to state wisdom and a willingness to take constructive steps in the direction of ending the arms race but to a desire to expedite nuclear tests. "I oppose a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement, even if it were verifiable [poddavalos proverke]," Assistant Defense Secretary R. Perle once said. Therein lies the essence of the position of many "hawks" in the administration, who regrettably carry great weight in the country's military and foreign policy.

Speaking in Congress the other day, Senator Hatfield, the well-known Republican, stated that people like Perle "do not care what agreement is being talked about since they do not want any agreement at all." Sincerely hoping for success at the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik, the senator said: "We must not allow such figures to reduce Soviet-U.S. cooperation to zero."

CEMA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMMUNIQUE CITED

PM131439 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

["Communique on the 120th Session of the CEMA Executive Committee" -- IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] The 120th Session of the CEMA Executive Committee was held in Moscow 8-9 October.

Taking part in the session were the following countries' representatives on the Executive Committee and deputy heads of government: K. Zarev from Bulgaria, J. Marjai from Hungary, Tran Quynh from the SRV, G. Kleiber from the GDR, A. Esquivel from Cuba, M. Peljee from Mongolia, W. Gwiazda from Poland, C. Pacoste from Romania, A. Antonov from the USSR, and R. Rohlicek from the CSSR, and CEMA Secretary V. Sychev.

M. Pejovski, member of the SFRY Federal Executive Council and SFRY permanent representaitve to CEMA, took part in the Executive Committee's work in accordance with the agreement between CEMA and the SFRY Government.

C. Pacoste, Romania's representative on the Executive Committee, chaired the session.

The main attention in the Executive Committee's work was devoted to a discussion of progress in the implementation of the decisions of the CEMA countries' economic summit and the preparation of materials for the next sitting of the CEMA session.

Agreement was reached on stepping up demands on the technical standards and quality of reciprocally delivered specialized products and the application of CEMA countries' advanced international and national standards to agreements and contracts. A number of avenues for specialization and production sharing, inluding in the television equipment sphere, were discussed with a view to implementing the Comprehensive Program for CEMA countries' Scientific and Technical Progress Through the Year 2000.

The countries' representatives on the Executive Council exchanged information on work to fulfill the economic summit decisions and specific measures to step up cooperation with the SRV.

Questions of developing CEMA countries' cooperation with developing countries and international economic organizations on treaty basis were also discussed.

The Executive Committee's session proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and comradely cooperation.

IZVESTIYA VIEWS CULTURE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

PM131523 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Text] Warsaw, 10 Oct -- The 13th conference of socialist countries' ministers of culture has ended in the Polish capital. The Soviet delegation was headed by USSR Minister of Culture V.G. Zakharov.

Representatives of Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nicaragua took part in the conference's work.

The sides exchanged views on topical problems of the development of their countries' cultural life, the final document of the conference emphasizes, and discussed questions of improving cultural policy in the light of tasks set by the 27th CPSU Congress and the forums of other fraternal parties.

The participants in the conference approved specific measures for the strengthening and deepening of multilateral and bilateral cooperation between socialist states in the cultural sphere. They spoke out in favor of expanding joint actions in the international arena. It was decided to give particular attention to the training of creative young people and to coordinate efforts on the development of the material base of culture within the CEMA framework. It was emphasized at the Warsaw conference that cultural figures from socialist community countries will play an active part in the 1987 celebration of the Great October Socialist Revolution's 70th anniversary.

The participants in the conference were received by W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of Poland's Council of State.

SOCIALIST CUSTOMS CONFERENCE HELD IN SRV

PM130915 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS dispatch: "Customs Workers' Conference"]

[Text] Ho Chi Minh City, 8 Oct -- A routine conference of leaders of socialist countries' customs authorities has been held here. Representatives of 10 socialist countries and observers from the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao people's Democratic Republic took part in the conference.

Attention at the conference focused mainly on the discussion of questions pertaining to the constant improvement of the work of customs in socialist countries. A proposal on the need to coordinate customs regulations in socialist countries in connection with the new forms of economic, scientific, and technical integration which was submitted by the Soviet delegation was approved, and the need to draw up standardized customs documentation and simplify the checking procedure was emphasized.

The conference participants discussed in detail the problem of combatting attempts to import material with an antisocialist and subversive bias. The West's aggressive circles are responding to the successes of the socialist states and their development programs adopted at the fraternal parties' congresses with a further intensification of their political and ideological sabotage.

The conference also discussed the question of combatting drug smuggling had been achieved thanks to exchanges of experience and information between the socialist countries' customs authorities. It was noted that despite the absence in socialist states of social conditions which lead to drug addiction, the struggle against the smuggling of "white death" was nonetheless topical.

PEREZ DE CUELLAR REELECTED UN SECRETARY GENERAL

LD102307 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT 10 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 10 TASS -- On the recommendation of the Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, at its today's plenary meeting, unanimously appointed Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru United Nations Secretary General for a new five-year term, from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1991. The promiment politician who enjoys profound esteem of the international community was warmly congratulated by representatives of the regional groups in the United Nations Organisation, by chairman of the 41st session of the General Assembly, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Humayun Rashid Chowdhury.

Speaking on behalf of the group of socialist countries in the United Nations, Foreign Minister of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Anatoliy Gurinovich confirmed the readiness and the wish of the states of the socialist community to continue many-faceted and fruitful cooperation with the United Nations secretary general, with all United Nations member countries for the sake of the triumph of the cause of peace, security, justice and progress on earth.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION DEBATE SUMMARIZED

LD101809 Moscow TASS in English 0827 GMT 10 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 10 TASS -- TASS correspoondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reporting:

The general political debate is drawing to a close at the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly. The dominant recurring theme in an overwhelming majority of speeches from the United Nations rostrum -- a total of 150 speakers took part in the debate -- was the idea about the need for making every effort to bring about a radical turn toward averting the threat of nuclear war and creating a safer and juster world for all. In their addresses to the session heads of delegations of the countries of very different orientations expressed the hope that the forthcoming meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders in Reykjavik would give an impetus to the process of genuine solution of the problem of arms limitation and disarmament.

Speaking on behalf of the Nonaligned Movement, the Movement's chairman, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, emphasized that the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would hold talks not only in the interests of their countries, but also in the interests of the whole world.

The proposal put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to discuss the question of establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and security received a broad backing at the session. Representatives of the international community said that the termination of nuclear tests would become a most important practical step in implementing that idea that came in line with the common interests.

The speakers called for the developoment of the unilateral Soviet moratorium into a multilateral one. It is not accidental that a storm of applause greeted the Soviet Union's readiness, voiced during the general political debate, to sign any time and anywhere, including in the United Nations, a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

An urgent signing of such a treaty ranks first among the practical measures in the disarmament field -- this conclusion was made in the addresses by heads of the delegations of the countries of the socialist community and of Sweden, India, Austria, Syria, Bhutan, and scores of other states. The discussion of specific items of the agenda is beginning at the plenary meetings and in the committees of the General Assembly. The main result of the general political debate is the call upon the General Assembly -- it was clearly formulated by the international community -- to use its entire authority and the United Nations potential that has been far from exhausted in order to adopt such decisions that would promote the practical development of world politics in compliance with the realities of the nuclear and space age.

VOSS ADDRESSES INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION SESSION

LD102044 Moscow TASS in English 1734 GMT 10 Oct 86

[Text] Buenos Aires October 10 TASS -- "Humanity is living through a period of extreme importance. What is required of governments and parliaments in this extreme situation as never before is the highest measure of realism and responsibility, bold and at the same time thoroughly considered steps dictated not only by national and state interests but also by the aspirations of entire humanity." This was said by head of the delegation of the Parliamentary groups of the USSR, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR Avgust Voss. He addressed the 76th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union under way here. "It is long since time to come to one's sense, to stop the suicidal arms race. The Soviet Union not only calls for ending this arms race but also takes practical steps toward this. The USSR has advanced of late a wide set of new important initiatives that are aimed at achieving a radical breakthrough in international affairs. A special place among them is held by a concrete programme of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction planned for a short period of 15 years, in conditions when an arms race in outer space would be reliably prevented."

"The Soviet Union has advanced an important initiative -- the idea of creating an all-embracing system of international security. Its fundamentals have been formulated all the aspects of the contemporary notion of international security -- the military, political, economic and humanitarian -- are presented in conjunction for the first time."

"And, finally, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev made recently a statement on a new, the fourth one, extension of the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear testing. It was a difficult, but, we believe, a very important step, one more step for the sake of our common security. "We are deeply convinced that the nuclear menace can be averted only by eliminating nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Union proposes. And the end of nuclear testing must be an initial step toward this. The moratorium on nuclear explosions would make it possible to halt the arms race, would place a barrier to its spread to space."

"The Soviet Union is countering the 'star wars' plan by declaring for a complete ban on a strike space arms, for the development of peaceful cooperation in space," Avgust Voss continued. "But we must note that Washington has not given a positive response to any of the Soviet peace initiatives. The United States answer is the speeding up of SDI," A. Voss said.

GORBACHEV MOSCOW TELEVISION ADDRESS 14 OCT

LD142027 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Address by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on "Vremya" program, live or recorded]

[Text] Dear comrades, you know that the day before yesterday, on Sunday, my meeting in Iceland with Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States of America, ended. A press conference took place on television on the results of the meeting. The text of the speech and my replies to journalists have been published. Having returned to the homeland, I consider it my duty to tell how things went and how we evaluate what has taken place in Reykjavik.

The results of the meeting in the capital of Iceland have just been discussed at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Tomorrow a report will be published on what kind of judgement has been pronounced by the leadership of our party about this major political event -- an event, whose consequences, we are convinced, will for a long time have an effect on international relations. Before Reykjavik, much was said and written about the forthcoming meeting. As usually happens in such cases, there was a multitude of suppositions and opinions. This is natural. The event did not pass without speculation, either. Now that the meeting has ended, its results are at the center of attention of the world public. Everybody is interested in what took place, what it produced and what kind of world there will be after it.

We strove at the meeting in Reykjavik to put the main issues in world politics, the halting of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, at the top of the agenda. That, in fact, is what happened. What are the reasons for our urgency in this matter? One frequently hears from abroad that the reason for this is our internal problems. In the calculations of the West, the thesis exists that the Soviet Union's economy will not, in the final analysis, bear up under the arms race; it will break and go cap in hand to the West; one has only to pressure it some more and to build up the position of strength. Incidentally, this could also be heard in the speech made, after our meeting by the U.S. President.

More than once I have had occasion to say that such plans are not only built on sand, but are dangerous, since they can lead to fatal political decisions. We know our problems better than other people do; we do have some, we discuss them openly, we tackle them, we have our plans, our approaches in this respect, and we have the common will of the party and of the people. In general, I have to say that the Soviet Union is strong today in its cohesion, in the political energy of the people, in its dynamism; and I think that these tendencies, and thus the strength of our society, will grow. We will always be able to stand up for ourselves. The Soviet Union has the means to answer any challenge, if this should be necessary. This is known by Soviet people, and ought to be known throughout the world.

But we do not want to play at power games. This is an extremely dangerous occupation in the nuclear-missile age. We are firmly convinced that the protracted, feverish state of international relations harbors the threat of a sudden and disastrous crisis. Practical steps are needed away from the nuclear abyss. Joint Soviet-American efforts -- the efforts of the whole world community -- are needed in order radically to improve international relations. In the name of these goals, on the eve of the meeting, before we received President Reagan's consent to a meeting, we in the Soviet leadership had done a lot of preparatory work.

In addition to the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, other departments, scientific representatives, military experts and specialists from various branches of industry took part in this work. The positions we worked out for the meeting in Reykjavik were the result of broad and continual discussion with our friends, with the leadership of the countries of the socialist community.

We sought to fill the meeting with matters of principle and far-reaching proposals.

Now about the meeting itself. How did events develop there? It is necessary to talk about this not just in order to establish the truth, which our partners in negotiations in Reykjavik are already distorting; but chiefly in order to share with you what we intend to do next.

The first meeting with President Ronald Reagan began on Saturday at 1030. After the greetings, indispensable on such occasions, and after a short meeting with reporters, we were left alone with one another, with just our interpreters. We exchanged opinions on the general situation, on how the dialogue between our countries is shaping up, and designated the issues we were to discuss.

Then I asked the President to listen to my specific proposals on the main issues which were the reasons we had come to this meeting. I have already spoken about these in some detail at the press conference. But nevertheless, I shall remind you of them briefly.

A whole package of major measure was put on the table which, if adopted, would initiate a new epoch in the life of mankind -- a nuclear-free epoch. Herein is the essence of a fundamental turning point in the world situation, the possiblity of which was evident and real. What was involved was not limitation of nuclear weapons, as was the case in the SALT I and SALT II treaties and other treaties, but the elimination of nuclear arms in a relatively short period.

The proposal dealt with strategic offensive weapons. I stated our readiness to cut these by 50 percent during the first 5 years. This involved halving strategic arms on land, at sea, and in the air. To make an agreement easier, we made a great concession: We removed our former demands to the Americans to include American medium-range missiles able to reach our territory, and the American forward-based arms, in the strategic equation.

We were also ready to take into account the concern of the United States about our heavy missiles. We viewed the proposal about strategic weapons in the context of their complete elimination as proposed by us on 15 January this year.

Our second proposal dealt with medium-range missiles. I suggested to the President the complete elimination of Soviet and American missiles of this class in Europe. And here, too, we made a great concession: We stated that, in contrast to our former position, the nuclear missiles weapons of Great Britain and France need not be counted in.

We took as our starting point the need to clear the way to detente in Europe, to free the European peoples from the fear of a nuclear disaster, and then to progress to the elimination of all nuclear arms. You will agree that this is also a bold step on our part.

Knowing in advance the objections there might be, we stated that we were willing to freeze nuclear weapons with a range of less than 1,000 km, and to start immediately on talks about their further fate. As for medium-range missiles in the Asian part of our country, a question which has always been present in the global option of President Reagan, we proposed starting talks on that question immediately.

As you can see, here, too, our proposals were of a major and serious nature, providing the opportunity for fundamentally resolving this problem, too.

The third issue, which I put before the President in the very first conversation, and which was an integral part of our package of proposals -- that is the existing treaty on antimissile defense and its ban on nuclear testing. Our approach is this: Once we enter a completely new situation, when a considerable reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination over a visibly short period are starting, it is necessary to safeguard oneself against all surprises. We are talking about weapons that up to now constitute the core of the defense of our country; therefore, everything that could undermine equality in the course of disarmament has to be excluded; any possibility of developing [sozdat] weapons of a new type securing military superiority must be excluded.

We believe this position to be perfectly natural and logical, and so we firmly stated the need for strict adherence to the ABM Treaty of 1972 that has no fixed period, and, moreover, in order to strengthen the conditions of that treaty, we proposed to the President that reciprocal obligations be undertaken on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union not to exercise the right of withdrawal from the treaty, at least for 10 years, and over that period to put an end to strategic weapons. Taking into account the particular difficulty which the administration has created for itself on this issue, when the President has personally linked himself with space weapons, with the so-called SDI, we did not request the cessation of work in this sphere, but the understanding that all the provisions of the ABM Treaty would be fully observed -- that is, that research and testing in this field would not go outside the confines of the laboratory. This is an identical limitation, both for the United States and for the Soviet Union.

As he listened to us, the President made remarks, and asked for some things to be explained in more detail; in the course of the conversation, we raised the question of monitoring [kontrol] in resololute and definite terms. Having tied it in with the pre [corrects himself], the post-nuclear situation. And this situation requires particular responsibility. I told the President that if both countries embark on the path of nuclear disarmament, then the Soviet Union will tighten up its position on monitoring. It must be real, all-encompassing, convincing, it must inspire total confidence in the reliability of the observance of the agreement, and contain the right to inspect on-site.

I must tell you, comrades, that the first reaction from the President was not entirely negative, He even said: What you have set forth just now reassures us. However, the fact did not escape us that our interlocutors -- both Comrade Shevardnadze and Mr Shultz had by now joined in the conversation on these issues -- that our interlocturos were in some confusion. At the same time, in their uncoordinated remarks there immediately appeared doubts and objections. The President and the secretary of state, began impromptu, as they say, to talk about divergences and disagreements. In these words of theirs, we clearly caught familiar old sounds which we have been hearing for many months at the Geneva talks.

We were reminded about all kinds of sublevels in strategic nuclear weapons, about an interim option for missiles in Europe, that we should join in the SDI -- we, the Soviet Union -- and replace the existing ABM Treaty with some new treaty. And we heard much more in this spirit from their side. I expressed surprise: How can it be? We are proposing to accept the American zero in Europe and sit down at a negotiating table over the medium-range missiles in Asia, while you, Mr President, are retreating from your previous position. I don't understand it. Regarding the ABM, we are proposing to preserve and consolidate that fundamental, important agreement, while you want to give it up and are even proposing to replace it with some new treaty, and thereby, after breaking with SALT II, also wrecking this mechanism which preserves strategic stability. I cannot understand that either.

We have also figured out the SDI plans, I said. If the United States creates a three-layer ABM system in space, we shall respond to that. But we are concerned by something else: SDI would mean weapon transfer to a new environment which would destabilize the strategic situation and make it even worse than today. If such is the U.S. objective, then that is what you should say. But if you truly want to have sound security for your own people and for the whole world, then the American position is absolutely groundless.

I told the President straight: We have advanced new major proposals while from you we are now hearing what everyone has truly had enough of, and what cannot lead anywhere. I ask you, Mr President, to examine our proposals once again, carefully, and to answer item by item. And I presented to him, translated into English, prepared earlier in Moscow, a draft of possible directives which, should agreement be reached in principle, we could give to our foreign affairs ministers and other departments for the preparation of three draft agreements. Then it would have been possible to sign them during my visit to the United States.

We met again in the afternoon. The President read out the position that had been drawn up during the break. It became clear after the very first sentence that we were again being offered -- as I put it at the press conference -- a load of mothballed junk which is already stifling the Geneva talks. All kinds of interim variants, numbers, levels, sublevels, and so on. Not one new thought. Not one fresh approach, not one idea that might have included event a hint at some kind of solution, at some kind of forward movement.

It became clear, comrades, that the Americans came to Reykjavik completely emptyhanded. The impression was created that they had come there only to gather fruit into their basket with empty hands. The situation was dramatic. The U.S. President was not prepared to decide the questions of principle in a major way, to come part way to meet us, so as to really give an impulse to talks that would produce results and give rise to hope. This is what I called for in my letter to the President in which I put forward the idea of holding the urgent and immediate meeting so as to give a powerful impulse at the level of the top leaders of the two countries, an impulse to the talks on disarmament, nuclear disarmament.

Convinced that our proposals had been carefully thought out, taking into account the interests of our partner, we decide not to give up on our efforts to achieve a breakthrough at the meeting. After many clarifying questions, a ray of hope appeared on strategic weapons. Latching onto this, we took yet another great step in the search for a compromise.

I said to the President: Both you and we have an acknowledged triad of strategic offensive weapons: these are land-based missiles, strategic submarines, and strategic bombers. So let us reduce each part of this triad by 50 percent. This does away with the need for all sorts of levels, sub-levels and all sorts of calculations. After lengthy debates, we managed to reach mutual understanding on this issue.

Then a discussion developed on the problem of medium-range missiles. The Americans stubbornly defended the so-called interim option, which envisaged retaining a part of their missiles remaining in Europe, including Pershing II missiles, and, of course, retaining our corresponding missiles, the SS-20, likewise. We came out categorically against this. I have already explained why. Europe deserves to be rid of nuclear weapons, to cease being a nuclear hostage. The President, for his part, had difficulty fighting against his own zero option, which he had been pushing for such a long time. Nevertheless, we sensed the Americans' intention to frustrate any agreement, under the guise of special concern for their allies in Asia. A lot was said about that by the American side that was unfounded. There is simply no point in repeating all this today.

And things started going well only when we made yet another step to meet them, on this issue as well. We agreed to the formula: zero missiles in Europe, and 100 warheads each on medium-range missiles in the East of our country, and correspondingly for the Americans on the territory of the United States respectively.

The main thing is that we managed to come to agreement on ridding the European Continent of nuclear missiles. Agreement was thus reached, too, on the issue of medium-range missiles. An important breakthrough was made in this aspect of nuclear disarmament, too.

The American Administration did not succeed in evading our persistent striving to get positive results. But the questions of ABM and a ban on nuclear explosions still remained.

Prior to our meeting the next day, on Sunday, for our third conversation, which according to the schedule should have been the final one, two groups of experts, from our side and the American side, worked through the night. They thoroughly analyzed what had been discussed at our two preceding meetings with the President and accordingly reported the results of their nighttime debates to myself and to the President. The result was as follows: A possibility emerged for getting down to elaborating agreements on strategic offensive weapons and on medium-range missiles.

In that situation, the ABM Treaty acquired a key significance. Its role was becoming even more important. Can we possibly wreck, said I, what until now has been somehow making it possible to restrain the arms race to some degree. And if now we are going to reduce strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, both sides should be confident tht nobody during that time will create new weapons that would undermine the stability and parity. That is why to me it seems completely logical to define a time limit. The Americans were speaking about 7 years; we proposed 10 years. The very same 10 years during which nuclear weapons were to be destroyed. We proposed 10 years during which neither the Soviet nor the American side would make use of the right, and they have such right, to abandon the ABM treaty. And research and experiments would be conducted in the laboratory only. And so I think you understand why 10 years. This is not coincidental, as I said before.

The logic here is simple and pure. In the first 5 years the first 50 percent of strategic weapons are cut, and in the second 5 years, the second half. That makes 10 years.

In this same connection, I proposed entrusting our responsible representatives with beginning full-scale talks on banning nuclear explosions in order, as a result, to work out an agreement on a complete and final ban on them. And during the preparation for such an agreement -- here, too, we showed flexibility and took a constructive position -- it would be possible at the same time to solve individual questions connected with nuclear explosions.

In response, we again heard an argument from the President which is very familiar from Geneva and from his public speeches, about how the SDI is a defense system, and, if we eliminate nuclear arms, how will we be able to defend ourselves from any madman who might get nuclear weapons into his hands, about how he is ready to share the results of the work on SDI with us.

To this latter remark, I told the President: Mr President, I am unable to take this idea of yours seriously, the idea that you will share with us the results of your work on SDI. At present, you do not even want to share oil industry equipment or dairy equipment with us. So do you expect us to believe a promise to share SDI developments with us? This would amount to a second American Revolution, and revolutions don't actually happen that often. I said to President Reagan: Let us be realists and pragmatists. That is a more reliable way. What we are discussing is too serious.

Incidentally, yesterday, when he was trying to justify his position on the SDI, the President said that he needed the program for America and its allies to remain invulnerable to a Soviet missile strike.

As you can see, the mention of the madmen is already missing. The Soviet threat has been dragged out into the open again. But that is absolute trickery. We have, after all, proposed to eliminate not only strategic, but all nuclear weapons at the disposal of the United States and the USSR. Under strict monitoring, incidentally. Why is the question of safeguarding the freedom of America and her friends from the Soviet nuclear missiles raised, then? If there would be no such missiles? If there are no nuclear weapons, who needs a defense against them? It follows that this whole venture with Star Wars is of an exclusively militarist nature, and it is aimed at gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union. Let us go back to the talks, however. Although the accord on strategic weapons and medium-range missiles had been reached, it was premature to think that all this had been finally decided in the course of the first two conversations alone.

Another whole day lay ahead. Almost 8 hours of tense and uninterrupted discussions, during which we had to return again and again to those questions, which, one might have thought, had already been agreed upon.

In these discussions, the President attempted to venture into ideological problems, demonstrating total ignorance, to put it mildly, and lack of understanding of what the socialist world is and what goes on in it. I rejected attempts to link ideological differences with questions of ending the arms race. I persistently brought the President and the secretary of state back to the matter on which we were meeting in Reykjavik.

I had to remind my collocutors time and again of item 3 of our package of proposals, without which agreement on the whole was impossible. I mean the need for strict adherence to the ABM Treaty, to consolidate the regime of that crucial treaty, and to ban nuclear tests.

Again and again we had to draw attention to what, one would have thought, were quite clear things. Given that we have agreed to get down to deep reductions in nuclear arms, we must create the sort of situation in which, not just in action, but even in thought, there should be no attempts to rock the strategic stability, or to get around the accords. We must -- there can only be one answer, which is that one. Therefore, we must have the certainty of the retention of the open-ended ABM Treaty.

You, Mr President, I said, must agree with the fact that, given that we have gone for nuclear arms reduction, there must be total certainty in the fact that the United States will not do anything behind the USSR's back, while the USSR is similarly not doing anything behind the United States' back which might put your security under threat, which would depreciate the agreement and create difficulties. And from this we have the key task of strengthening the ABM conditions: not to go out into space with the developments [razrabotki] of this program and remain within the framework of the laboratory. The 10 years of not exercising the right to abandon the ABM Treaty are essential to create confidence in the fact that, in resolving the problem of arms reduction, we are guaranteeing the security of each side, and I would even say security throughout the world as well.

But the Americans were clearly inclined toward something else. We saw that the United States in fact wants to weaken the ABM Treaty, to revise it in order to develop [razrabotat] a large-scale space ABM system, in their own egoistic interests. To agree to this would have simply been irresponsible on my part.

Regarding nuclear tests -- here, too it was clearer than daylight why the American side does not want to conduct talks in earnest on this subject. It would prefer to make them endless, to defer a solution of the problem of banning nuclear tests for decades. For the umpteenth time we had to reject attempts to use talks as a screen for freedom of action in the sphere of nuclear tests. At the meeting I said bluntly: I have doubts about the honesty of the U.S. position. Is there indeed nothing in this position which can be detrimental to the Soviet Union? How can one agree to scrapping nuclear armaments if the United States continues to improve them? We were still left with the impression that the chief obstacle was SDI. If it could be removed, it would be possible to agree on banning nuclear tests, nuclear blasts, as well.

At a certain stage when it became quite clear that continuing the discussions was a waste of time, I reminded them: We have proposed a definite package of measures and I request that you regard it as such. If you and I have worked out common positions on the possibility of major reductions of nuclear weapons and have not reached agreement on the ABM issue and the issue of nuclear tests, then everything we have tried to create here collapses.

The President and the secretary of state reacted to this firmness of ours painfully. But I could not pose the question any differently. It was a matter of the security of the country, of the security of the whole world, of all people and continents.

An impasse had arisen. We proposed major, really large-scale things that were clearly compromises. We made concessions. However, I did not see even the slightest desire on the American side to reply to us in the same way or to make any movement to meet us. We began to think of how to end this meeting, these discussions.

Nevertheless, we continued our endeavors to get our partners to follow a constructive path.

The conversation planned as the final one had exceeded the permitted time period. In this situation, instead of going away, we to Moscow and they to Washington, we agreed once again to have a break, let the sides think everything over, and to meet again after dinner. Returning to the town mayor's house after the break, we made another attempt to end the meeting with success. We presented the following text as a basis for reaching a positive result. Here is that text. I quote:

The USSR and the United States would pledge, for a period of 10 years, to refrain from using their given right to abandon the indefinite ABM Treaty, and for the duration of this period strictly adhere to all of its provisions. The testing of all space elements of an antimissile defense in space is forbidden, except research and testing carried out in laboratories. During the first 5 years of this 10-year period, up to 1991 inclusive, the strategic offensive weapons of the sides will be reduced by 50 percent. During the following 5 years of this period the remaining 50 percent of the strategic offensive weapons of the sides will be reduced. Thus, by the end of 1996 the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and of the United States will be totally eliminated.

Commenting on this text, I made an important addition, referring to a document handed to the President at the close of our first conversation. Its essence lay in saying that at the end of 10 years, when there would be no nuclear weapons, we propose the elaboration at special talks of a mutually acceptable decision on how to proceed further. However, this time, too, our attempts to reach agreement did not yield results. For 4 hours we again tried to persuade our interlocutors of the well-founded nature of our approach, in which nothing threatened them, which did not harm the interests of the United States' real security. But the longer this went on, the clearer it became that the Americans were not going to agree to limiting research [issledovaniye], development [razrabotka] and testing in the SDI program to the laboratory. They are dying to have weapons in space.

I stated firmly that we will never agree to helping with our own hands to wreck the ABM Treaty. For us this is a matter of principle, of our national security. And so, finding ourselves literally one, or two, or three steps from making decisions that could be historic for the whole nuclear space age, we could not take this step, or these steps. There was no turning point in world history, although -- and once again I say this with conviction -- it was possible.

But our conscience is clear. There is nothing to reproach us with. We did everything we could. Our partners did not have sufficient breadth of approach, understanding of the unique natuere of the moment, and in the final analysis courage, responsibility and political determination, which are so necessary in solving such most important, urgent world problems. They remained in their old positions, which time has already undermined and which do not correspond to contemporary reality.

Foreigners in Iceland asked me, and comrades here ask me, what I see as the reasons for this conduct by the American delegation at the Reykjavik meeting.

There are many reasons, both subjective and objective ones, but the main one is that the leadership of that great country is too dependent on the military-industrial complex, on monopolist groups who have turned the race in nuclear and other weapons into a business, means of making profits, the aim of their existence and the point of their activities.

It seems to me that in their appraisal of the situation the Americans are making two serious errors. One is tactical -- they think that the Soviet Union, sooner or later, will reconcile itself to the attempts to revive American strategic dictate, will go in for a limitation of only Soviet, for a reduction of only Soviet weapons, and will do this because, they say, it has a greater interest than the United States in an accord on the problem of disarmament. But that is a profound delusion, and the quicker the Americans rid themselves of it -- that is, the American Administration, and I am saying this for perhaps the hundredth time -- the better it will be, both for them and for our relations and for the whole world situation.

The other error is a strategic one. The United States wants to exhaust the Soviet Union economically through a race in the most up-to-date and expensive space weapons. It wants to create various kinds of difficulties for the Soviet leadership, to wreck its plans, including in the social sphere, in the sphere of improving the standard of living of our people, thus arousing dissatisfaction among the people with their leadership, the leadership of the country, and by the same means to limit the opportunities of the Soviet Union in its economic ties with the developing countries. And they, in such a situation, will all be forced to go cap in hand to the United States of America. Far-reaching schemes, but both the strategy and the strategic line of the present administration are also being built on delusions.

It would appeal that in Washington they neither want to burden themselves with an attentive analysis of changes which are taking place in our country, nor do they want to draw the corresponding practical conclusions for themselves and for their course. They are trying to indulge in wishful thinking, and on the basis of this delusion are building a policy of relations with the USSR. Of course, all the long-term consequences of such a policy are not difficult to foresee. But one thing is already clear to us now: It will not bring anyone -- it cannot bring anyone anything positive, including the United States itself.

Before speaking before you today, I read the statement by the U.S. President about Reykjavik. What stands out is the fact that the President ascribes all of the proposals which were discussed to himself. Well, obviously, these proposals are so attractive for the American people and the peoples of the whole world that one can resort to such cunning! We are not gnawed by vanity. But all the same it's important that people should obtain a true picture of the course of affairs in Reykjavik. What else?

I have already said at the press conference that work done both before the meeting, and there, in Reykjavik, will not go to waste. We ourselves thought over many things, in connection with this meeting, and reviewed many things.

We have now cleared the way to better carry out a further struggle for peace and disarmament. We have gotten rid of the obstructions that had built up, of details and trivialities, of stereotypes that were holding up new approaches in this most important area of policy.

We know where we are. We see our capabilities more clearly. The preparations for Reykjavik helped us to formulate a platform, a new, bold platform which enlarges the chances for fiscal success. It is in accordance with the interests of our people and society at the new stage of its socialist development. At the same time this platform is in accordance with the interests of all other countries and peoples, and therefore deserves trust. We are convinced that it will be met with understanding in many countries of the world, and in the most varied political and public circles.

I think that a great many people throughout the world, including persons vested with power, will be able and bound to draw serious conclusions from Reykjavik. Everyone will have to think again and again: What is it all about? Why do such obstinate efforts to create a breakthrough, and move forward to a nuclear-free world, to general security, not yet yield the necessary results? I would hope that the President, too, has a more accurate and more complete idea today of the course of our analysis, the intentions of the Soviet Union, the possibilities for, and limits to movement in the Soviet position -- more accurate and complete in particular because Mr Reagan got them at first hand; I mean the clarifications about our constructive steps for the sake of stabilizing and improving the international situation.

It is obvious that the American leadership needs a certain amount of time. We are realists, and recognize clearly that issues which over many years, decades even, have not found solutions can hardly be resolved in a single sitting. We have quite a bit of experience in conducting affairs with the United States of America. We know how changeable the internal political weather can be, how strong and influential the enemies of peace are on the other side of the Atlantic. None of this is new to us, or unexpected. And if we do not give up, do not slam the door, do not give vent to our annoyance -- although there are more than enough grounds for doing all this -- it is just because we are sincerely convinced of the need for new efforts for the construction of normal interstate relations in the nuclear age. There is simply no other way.

And one more thing: After Reykjavik the notorious SDI has stepped even further into everyone's view as a symbol of obstruction to the cause of reluctance to remove the nuclear threat looming over humanity. It is impossible to interpret it in any other way. This is one of the most important lessons of the Reykjavik meeting.

Briefly summing up these highly concentrated days, I would summarize them as follows: The recent meeting was a major event. A reappraisal took place. A qualitatively new situation has come about. Nobody can now act in the same way as he acted before. The new meeting was a useful one. It prepared a possible step forward, toward a real shift to the better, if the United States will finally adopt realistic positions and renounce illusions in its appraisals. The meeting persuades us of the correctness of the course we have chosen, of the need for and the constructive nature of the new political thinking in the nuclear age.

We are full of energy and resolve. Having made a start in restructuring, the country has already proceeded some distance. We have only just begun, but there has been an advance.

Growth in industrial output over 9 months came to 5.2 percent. Labor productivity rose by 4.8 percent. The national income has increased 4.3 percent compared with last year.

All these indexes are above the planned levels for this year. And this is the most powerful support on the part of our people, for these are all the fruits of our people's labor; the most powerful support for our party's policy is support in getting things done. This indicates that the labor of the people in the new conditions permits the economic potential of the country to grow more rapidly, and thereby strengthens its defensive potentialities.

The Soviet people and the Soviet leadership are united that the policy of socialism can and must be only a policy of peace and disarmament. We will not diverge from the course of the 27th CPSU Congress.

Thank you for your attention.

POLITBURO HEARS, APPROVES GORBACHEV REPORT

PM151331 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 86 p 1

["At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo"]

[Text] At the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. On 14 October a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo was held, at which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, gave a report on the results of his meeting with the U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik. The Politburo noted that the Soviet-American summit meeting was an important event in international life, in the struggle against the arms race and for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for removing the military threat from the whole of the earth.

The position of the Soviet side at this meeting was honest and open. It was based on the principles of equality and equal security; it took account of the interests of both countries, of their allies, and of the peoples of all states; it was a concrete expression of a new approach, a new way of thinking, the need for which is dictated by the realities of the nuclear missile age. Manifesting a sincere aspiration to reach an accord, the Soviet side submitted new compromise proposals, which took full account of the concern of the U.S. side, and made possible an agreement on such very important issues as the reduction, and the future, total elimination, of strategic offensive weapons and the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The implementation of these proposals would open up the possibility of a drastic turning point in the development of international relations, the removal of the nuclear threat, and the development of peaceful cooperation among all members of the world community.

Unfortunately, it did not prove possible to embody the de facto agreement on the issues indicated in accords binding the sides. The sole cause of this in the final analysis was the stubborn reluctance of the U.S. Administration to create conditions for the implementation of these accords by strengthening the ABM regime and accepting the corresponding obligations, equal for both sides. Such behavior forces one to doubt even more the statements of Washington that, as they say, the SDI program is of an exclusively "peaceful" nature. Simple logic prompts the thought that if there is no sword, then no shield is needed. But by all accounts, another purpose is being earmarked for this program.

Having approved the activities of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the meeting with President Ronald Reagan, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo notes that a qualitatively new situation has come about. The struggle for nuclear disarmament has reached a higher level, from which it is now necessary further to step up efforts with the aim of radical reductions and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In this respect it was stressed that contacts and negotiations must continue, including those in Geneva, on the whole range of issues connected with nuclear and space weapons on the basis of the platform put forward by the Soviet side in Reykjavik. It would be a fatal step to pass by the historic chance for a cardinal solution to the problems of war and peace. Everything must be done to make use of this chance. This meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the United States, the interests of the whole of mankind.

At the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo concrete foreign policy measures, directed at conducting this principled line in connection with the results of the meeting in Reykjavik, were examined and approved.

U.S. TRIES TO JUSTIFY 'UNCONSTRUCTIVE' STANCE

Reagan Television Address

LD141224 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Excerpt] President Ronald Reagan has gone on U.S. television with an address to the country on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit-level meeting held in Reykjavik. His speech amounted to a justification of the unconstructive [nekonstruktivnaya] position by Washington, which wrecked [sorvat] the achievement of real and effective arms control measures. This, in point of fact, Reagan confirmed when he acknowledged that his tough position on the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, known as the star wars program, hindered the realization of a far-reaching agreement outlined at the meeting in the field of nuclear arms reduction. He did not hide the fact that such an agreement does not suit Washington because it would have deprived the United States of the opportunity to implement the SDI program.

The White House's position, which pleases the interests of the U.S. military, threatens the vital interests of all humanity, including those of the American people, and evokes sharp criticism from sensible circles in the United States. [passage omitted]

Shultz Report to NATO Council

LD131727 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Brussels October 13 TASS -- TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

A special session of the NATO Council at the level of foreign ministers of the NATO member-countries has been held here today to hear a report of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on the Soviet-American summit meeting, which closed in Reykjavik on Sunday.

George Shultz addressed a press conference on the results of the session, which demonstrated serious embarrassment of the U.S. Administration in face of the bitter disappointment among the allies at the outcome of the meeting. George Shultz was trying to justify the unconstructive stand of President Reagan on the basic problem of the present -- that of putting an end to the arms race on earth and preventing its spreading into outer space.

U.S. LEGISLATORS RUE 'MISSED OPPORTUNITY'

PM141325 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Oct 86 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Real Opportunity Missed: That Is What U.S. Legislators Are Saying"]

[Text] Washington, 13 Oct -- Sensible U.S. legislators do not hide their profound disappointment with the fact that, because of the U.S. side's obstinacy, a real opportunity to reach substantial agreements during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik has been missed. "This has been a bitter day," Senator C. Pell stated in an AP interview. "We turned down a bird in the hand, the reduction of strategic offensive arms, for two in the bust, the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.' One can only hope," the senator continued, "that President Reagan will review his position and agree to the Soviet proposals."

Senator G. Hart, considered a possible Democratic Party contender for the Presidency in the 1988 presidential election, stated in a NEW YORK TIMES interview that the administration appears to consider implementation of the "star wars" program more important than effective measures in the arms control sphere. Many of us have tried to show that reckless adherence to a dubious space-based defense system will block real progress in the arms control sphere, the senator said. By all accounts, that is what has happened.

Congressman E. Markey stated that President Reagan missed an opportunity to "swap the 'star wars' program for the best deal the Russians have offered."

Millions of people throughout the world pinned their hopes on arms control progress during the Soviet-U.S. summit, Senator F. Lautenberg stated in an interview for AP. "If we want to progress in resolving the existing problems," he stressed, "the dialogue must be continued."

Senator S. Nunn, a Democrat and a leading member of the Armed Services Committee, stated: "It seems to me that the administration has changed its main priorities on the arms control issue. It began by considering it necessary to reduce the Soviet first-strike systems to a level which would strengthen stability. The administration's main focus and main priority has now become the defense of SDI, even at the cost of rejecting sharp reductions in the Soviet systems. There should be no rejoicing at this news." The senator predicted that the administration's requests for new appropriations for SDI will now be the "subject of more thorough scrutiny than ever before" in Congress. The United States is in a difficult financial position, S. Nunn noted. For that reason, SDI is not only a strategic decision but an economic one.

'CONCERN' OVER AFTERMATH REPORTED IN WASHINGTON

Comments on Press

PM141403 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Blinov dispatch: "Not Without Prompting From Ultrarightists"]

[Text] Washington -- It is with a clear sense of concern that American newspapers are reporting that the Reykjavik meeting ended without reaching accords on questions of disarmament, although the two countries' leaders were close to doing so.

"Impasse Over SDI"; "Dreams of SDI Outweighed Hope of Arms Control" -- these are the headlines of articles in today's newspapers. The press cites the assessments of the meeting and its results which M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made at a press conference in the Icelandic capital. It particularly singles out the words that the "historic opportunity" of reaching very important agreements in the disarmament sphere was missed because of the American side's stubborn reluctance to abandon the plans to deploy space weapons.

An article over the signature of Lou Cannon, THE WASHINGTON POST's White House correspondent, admits that "far-reaching potential nuclear arms reduction accords came up against an obstacle -- the 'star wars' program." As Robert Kaiser and Walter Pincus write in the same newspaper, "the 'star wars' program has pushed back real progress in the matter of implementing radical nuclear arms reductions." "SDI," the article reads, "has a powerful clan of supporters in weapons manufacturers, members of Congress, and military figures. Adherents of SDI both within the administration and in Congress and in the Republican Party have seized upon it as a 'sacred cause' that must be continued at any price. For example, on the eve of the Reykjavik meeting Congressman J. Kemp implored Reagan not to agree to anything in Reykjavik that might harm SDI."

The informed commentators R. Evans and R. Novak report that at the beginning of October, that is, literally on the eve of the Reykjavik meeting, a number of influential SDI adherents -- both Republicans and Democrats -- sent Reagan a letter with "extraordinary" contents. The letter recommended embarking on the immediate deployment of SDI without waiting for the final results of all the research. Those who signed the letter included Zbigniew Brzezinski, former permanent U.S. representative at the United Nations; and a number of senators and member of the House of Representatives.

Newspapers believe, however, that these actions could elicit a counterreaction from those Americans who understand the danger of intensifying the arms race.

Political 'Turmoil'

PM150803 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent L. Koryavin dispatch: "Washington After Reykjavik"]

[Text] Washington -- Washington is in turmoil. Political discussions on the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting which ended in Reykjavik are building up. Even though the meeting fell on Saturday and Sunday, followed by another public holiday in the United States -- Columbus Day, there proved to be a broad circle of political figures, representatives of the public, and journalists taking part in the debates.

The main topic of television commentaries, press material, and public and private conversations is the disarmament problem which was discussed in Reykjavik. Something many people in the United States deliberately wanted to avoid even yesterday is being actively debated in the country today: Hardly anyone can now dispute the truth that there is no more topical task for mankind than the task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. And the first conclusion from today's situation:

The administration will not succeed in avoiding discussion of the key problems of disarmament, while the Soviet initiatives, which generated a major response here, gave an impetus for their practical solution and most serious deliberations.

When U.S. President R. Reagan came down the aircraft steps at Andrews Base one television commentator said that he has returned empty-handed. This comment needs amplification. The President did not bring the Americans any disarmament agreement because the United States refused to accept the USSR's constructive and sensible proposals.

Instead of seeking agreements, Washington is relying on a "policy of strength." Its arsenal still contains old formulations like, for example, "the way to disarmament lies only through the super-armament [sverkhvooruzheniye] of America." The U.S. President's latest statement was imbued with these very ideas. Correspondents expected a statement by R. Reagan on his return to Andrews Base from Reykjavik, and they also expected a press conference in the traditional Blue Room of the White House, but the head of the administration avoided meeting the press. The President spoke on television from the Oval Office and, as before, upheld his positions and primarily the "star wars" program.

The approach displayed toward the Reykjavik meeting became a kind of test of political maturity and sincerity in the solution of disarmament problems. The U.S. President's stance was backed primarily by the country's right-wing circles and the military-industrial complex. Incidentally,the approach toward the "star wars" program, as THE BALTIMORE SUN writes, has been turned by conservatives into their ideological test of loyalty to their principles. A television commentary by Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle reflected the viewpoint of military circles and contained the same stereotyped praise of SDI, which would supposedly bring security to the United Staes and would "force the Russians" to come to the agreements needed by Washington.

Observers emphasize that adminstration will have to face a difficult task: "how to justify the results of Reykjavik." It cannot fail to perceive the increased role of the public opinion factor in the United States. Now it is also necessary to take into account the opinion of West European allies, who had also placed hopes on the meeting. The White House is also perturbed by the prospect of relations with Congress. Congressman Foley said that Reagan's speech was just the first explanation, and it must be followed by other, more detailed explanations.

The reaction by Congress to the Reykjavik meeting is far from uniform. Those who sent the President off to the Soviet-U.S. meeting bidding him "not to falter," "not to give in" on disarmament questions, and particularly with respect to the "star wars" program, cannot hide their gratification. This was openly declared by Jack Kemp, leader of th "new right" congressmen. There are, however, other views in Congress. People here recall how Congress welcomed the President on his return from Geneva, where positive developments emerged in the process of disarmament and Soviet-U.S. relations. Today, observers point out, the President will not be given such a hospitable reception; on the contrary, his stance is being subjected to sharp criticism by many congressmen and senators.

Here it is also assumed that the debates on the "star wars" program, which blocked the reaching of agreement in Reykjavik, will be exacerbated in Congress.

The Republican administration's refusal to come to an agreement which would have played a historic role in the disarmament process will no doubt have an effect on the forthcoming elections to the country's supreme legislative body. Less than 3 weeks remain until the elections, and the champions of restrictions on military expenditure in the Democratic Party are taking a more active stance in the struggle for seats in Congress.

Summing up the initial results, it can be said that the intransigence of the administration's stance on questions of the arms race and the desire to transfer it to space create for it real difficulties not only in the international arean but also in the country's domestic political situation.

OFFICIALS HOLD TALKS ON REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

Bessmertnykh, Mitterrand Meeting

LD141742 Moscow TASS in English 1725 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Paris October 14 TASS -- Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, who arrived here from Reykjavik in accordance with the agreement reached, was received today by Francois Mitterrand, president of France. On the instruction of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he told the president about the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The conversation was attended by Yakov Ryabov, USSR ambassador to France.

Bessmertnykh on UK, French Arms

LD151014 Belgarde TANJUG in English 2318 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Paris, October 14 (TANJUG) -- Special envoy of Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev, assistant Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said this evening that for the present French and British nuclear potentials are being left aside in Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks. At a press conference here this evening Bessmertnykh, who today informed French President Francois Mitterrand on Soviet assessments of the Reykjavik summit, said that the action to free Europe from nuclear arms will largely depend in the future on the level of responsibility of all countries that possess nuclear weapons. Bessmertnykh said that he conveyed to President Mitterrand personal assessments of Gorbachev concerning his meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

Mitterrand, on his part, conveyed to Bessmertnykh his views on the last week's summit.

Rogachev Briefing in PRC

LD151104 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1025 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Beijing, 15 Oct (TASS) -- Igor Rogachev, special representative of the Soviet Government, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Oleg Troyanovskiy, USSR ambassador to the PRC, met with Qian Qichen, deputy PRC minister of foreign affairs, and briefed him on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The Soviet side stressed that the meeting in Iceland was an event of exceptional significance for the international life. Major far-reaching proposals by the Soviet Union on a number of key issues related to limiting and reducing nuclear armaments -- which were put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee -- were rendered. It was noted that the stand assumed by President Reagan on the SDI issue, prevented specific decisions from being reached.

The Chinese side expressed hope that the USSR and the United States would continue their efforts in the search for mutually acceptable accords in order to achieve substantial progress on the issue of monitoring armaments. That, in Qian Qichen's opinion, would assist in easing tensions in the world.

On completion of the ninth round of the Soviet-Chinese political consultations, Igor Rogachev left Beijing.

Karpov on Thatcher Meeting

LD141146 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1134 GMT 14 Oct 86

[By Paul Cheston, PA staff reporter]

[Excerpts] A top Soviet official today spoke to the world's press outside No. 10 Downing Street -- the first time such a high-ranking Russian envoy has done so. Chief arms negotiator Mr Viktor Karpov talked about his longer than expected one-and-a-half hour meeting with Mrs Thatcher.

The prime minister gave full-hearted support to President Reagan's defence of his star wars programme at the Iceland summit. But Mr Karpov emerged to say he had had "a very useful discussion" with Mrs Thatcher and talked of his hopes for new disarmament talks in Geneva.

Speaking in fluent English, Mr Karpov said: "I talked to the prime minister about the results of the Reykjavik meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. I expressed our opinion about why the meeting failed to produce results that could mean a movement forward in resolving all the complicated but very important issues of nuclear disarmament."

Mr Karpov said that both he and Mrs Thatcher agreed that more effort was needed to break the deadlock in disarmament negotiations.

Asked about a new meeting, Mr Karpov said: "I think the results of the Reykjavik meeting should be pondered on by both sides and it could take some time." When pressed to name a time and place for a new meeting with President Reagan, Mr Karpov replied simply: "Geneva."

Mr Karpov then touched on his personal relationship with Mrs Thatcher, and when asked whether he had had a sympathetic hearing, he replied: "We had a discussion and, of course, not all our views coincide." [passage omitted]

Mr Karpov's meetings with Mrs Thatcher and Baroness Young, deputy foreign secretary, were arranged while he was in Reykjavik as part of Mr Gorbachev's team on Saturday. According to officials, a message was received by the foreign Office in London pointing out that he planned a series of European visits to discuss the summit and asking if it would be convenient to visit London.

Petrovskiy Report at UN

LD150705 Moscow TASS in English 0634 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 15 TASS -- The delegation of the USSR to the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly Tuesday briefed session delegates on the results of the Reykjavik meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy told the General Assembly's First (Political) Committee that the meeting had aimed to give a fillip to constructive progress in the key areas of world politics, launch productive efforts to cut back on arms and reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war, and start work, at long last, to fulfil the understandings reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985. "The Soviet delegation did not come to the Icelandic capital empty-handed," he said. "It took there a whole package of major, compromise proposals which, had they been accepted, could indeed make for early breakthroughs in all areas of nuclear arms control, really fend off the threat of a nuclear war, and allow progress toward a nuclear-free world."

"The historic chance to come to terms on the whole package of agreements was squandered due to the obstructionist stand of the U.S. Administration," the Soviet representeative said. "It cannot be said that the meeting in Reykjavik was in vain," he said. "It was a step in the difficult dialogue in a search for solutions."

"There emerged the outlines of almost final accords but it just did not prove possible to finalize them there," Petrovskiy explained, adding: "The very road covered to such major accords on so significant cuts in nuclear arms is by itself a tremendous amount of experience and a huge gain. "The Reykjavik meeting was an exceptionally important event in international life and a major landmark in the Soviet-U.S. relationship."

"We believe," he said, "that there is no reason to despair. The meeting led us to the very important stage of understanding where we stand, and showed that agreements are possible."

"The formula for the further march forward is very simple: dialogue, realism and a sense of responsibility," the Soviet deputy foreign minister said. "We are convinced that in efforts for such a continuation, we shall not be alone and shall be acting together with all peace-minded forces.:

COMMENTARIES ON SUMMIT RESULTS, REACTION

IZVESTIYA on End of Summit

PM131930 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by special correspondents A. Bovin, N. Yefimov, and A. Palladin: "Expectations and Unexpected Developments"]

[Text] Reykjavik -- The last day of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik was a day of tense expectation for the 2,000 journalists here to cover the Soviet-U.S. summit talks. But let us narrate everything in its proper order.

It was learned the day before that the two sides had set up two working groups: one for disarmament questions, the second for humanitarian and regional problems and bilateral relations. Something else was also learned. Both groups were summoned to the Villa Hofdi and right away, without wasting any time, embarked on the elaboration of coordinated proposals. This issue of the newspaper carried a full account of M.S. Gorbachev's press conference in Reykjavik, and our readers know the scale of the proposals that were being discussed and coordinated there.

The working groups displayed both endurance and staying power. The first worked for 10 hours and 20 minutes, without closing an eye until morning. The second did not work quite as long, but also worked until dawn. The journalists drew the conclusion: Something is brewing and, in all probability, it is major decisions that are brewing. After all, matters of secondary importance are not discussed through the night.

On Sunday morning the journalists tried by hook and by crook to worm out of one another what they knew about what was happening and what was being prepared. Everything indicated that something important was in the air. U.S. journalists felt that their Soviet colleagues had more information. Soviet journalists felt the exact opposite. Everyone was glued to television screens at the press center.... Icelandic Television constantly kept an "eye" on the Villa Hofdi.

A press conference by M.S. Gorbachev was scheduled for 1400 hours. Journalists moved to take their places in the hall. But the press conference did not start at 1400 hours. Nor did it start at 1500 hours. It was announced that the summit meeting would be extended. There was no provision for this in the prearranged scenario. The press conference was postponed until 1800 hours. A correspondent of the American CNN-TV commented for the millions of viewers: "If it has been decided to extend the meeting, this means that both sides feel that accords are possible, and even more, that their positions are very close and they now hope to cover the small distance between them and reach a compromise." Was the U.S. correspondent hasty? We do not think so. He was thinking logically. The world was very close to hearing about historic decisions. About decisions which would have had a colossal effect on Soviet-U.S. relations and on the entire course of international life.

Meanwhile, the unplanned round of talks went on for more than 4 hours. For the journalists this meant more than 4 hours of tension, expectation, and even disappointment. We stood in front of a television set in the lobby of the movie theater rented for the press conference. We were in the midst of a clamoring crowd of journalists and waited for M.S. Gorbachev (whose turn it was to play host at Hofdi) to see off the U.S. President. You should have heard the unanimous sigh that escaped the hundreds of people in front of the television set. That sigh contained disappointment and bitterness. The screen showed a closeup of the tense and, as it appeared to us, confused [skonfuzhennyy] face of the U.S. President. The President even seemed to forget -- and he rarely does this -- that correspondents and television cameras were observing the farewell from a special platform. He did not glance at them, did not say farewell. When the President first appeared in front of the Villa Hofdi, a U.S. correspondent called out to him: "Are you ready to do business here?" He replied confidently: "This is what we are here for." But he proved not to be ready to do exactly this, to do business. It was as if the U.S. correspondent had sensed this in advance.

This is how the summit meeting ended. We are convinced that, even though an agreement was not reached in Reykjavik, the talks were not wasted. [paragraph continues]

They showed that nothing is impossible and that even most complex and most delicate disarmament problems can be solved. As you already know from M.S. Gorbachev's statements, the USSR and the United States were on the brink of making major decisions. They were. Had the U.S. ruling circles not believed in the illusion of military superiority over the Soviet Union, Reykjavik would have gone down in all annals not as an example of missed opportunities -- of great opportunities, actually -- but as a symbol of common sense and new thinking.

Reykjavik failed to become such a symbol. The Reagan administration and the forces that stand behind it and determine its course proved to be blind and shortsighted. Blind as politicians and shortsighted as statesmen.

This day ended in a most unexpected fashion. Altogether fantastic. President R. Reagan addressed servicemen at the U.S. base in Keflavik, near the Icelandic capital. The White House chief collected his wits and, taking advantage of the "blackout," in other words the two sides' agreement not to reveal to journalists any information about the course of the meeting, suddenly disclosed that apparently he and he alone made all the proposals at the negotiating table. This was said by the head of delegation who appeared in Reykjavik emptyhanded, without any political baggage. "I will unhesitatingly follow anyone who talks to me in the language of truth," W. Whitman wrote. To judge by the speech in Keflavik, Americans are being offered the exact opposite.

PRAVDA on European Reaction

PM141425 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kharlanov dispatch under general heading "The Echo of Reykjavik: Seeing the Historical Perspective"]

[Text] Brussels, 13 Oct -- U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz flew to the Belgian capital today in order to present the U.S. version of the course and results of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan at an extraordinary session of the NATO Council. The secretary of state's mission, as local observers point out, is by no means easy. It is really difficult, very difficult to explain to the U.S. NATO allies what happened in Reykjavik and why the U.S. side, clinging to the "star wars" program, wrecked the agreements which began emerging in Iceland and which would have been historically significant not only for the United States and the USSR but also for the fate of the whole world.

The U.S. stance caused particular disappointment among broad political circles in West Europe which linked the Reykjavik meeting with far-reaching hopes for progress along the path of arms reductions and particularly the solution of the problem of medium-range missiles deployed here. An agreement on medium-range missiles, former Belgian Foreign Minister H. Simonet stated, could have been an event of exceptional importance for Europe and would have influenced not only the foreign but also the domestic policy of several countries, including Belgium.

P. Lefevre, observer of the newspaper LE SOIR, asserts that in Reykjavik Reagan set his view of planetary security based on the "star wars" program, which is shared by only a part of U.S. political world, in opposition to the possibility of achieving a sharp reduction of nuclear missile weapons, which would have led to a real strengthening of security on the globe.

The newspaper LIBRE BELGIQUE, for its part, expresses the hope that even so, despite the failure in Reykjavik, the USSR and the United States would continue their contacts on questions of arms reduction with a view to achieving mutually acceptable solutions.

PRAVDA on Praise for Gorbachev

PM141429 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[Special correspondents T. Kolesnichenko and A. Maslennikov dispatch under general heading "The Echo of Reykjavik: Seeing the Historical Perspective"]

[Text] Reykjavik, 13 Oct -- The press conference given by M.S. Gorbachev in Reykjavik on the conclusion of the meeting with the U.S. President attracted great attention throughout the world. Its contents are already known to millions of people in all corners of the planet -- the press conference was televised to many countries.

The statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee outlined real prospects for the continuation of the struggle for disarmament and the mobilization in this noble cause of all realistically minded politicians and peace-loving forces on the planet.

Following the conclusion of the press conference, we conversed with many Western colleagues and also with political scientists and specialists on military-strategic questions who had come to Reykjavik.

"I was greatly impressed by the press conference," we are told by J. (Barton) [as published], chief of NEWSWEEK's Moscow office. "I was stunned by M.S. Gorbachve's inexorable logic and his ability to single out the main issue. His analysis of the international situation makes us ponder the most important problems facing us all."

"The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee painted a profound and convincing picture of why the disarmament talks held here now ended in deadlock," H. Pick, political observer of the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN, noted. "Now the question is how to resolve the contradictions, particularly the question of the fate of the 'star wars' program which became the main obstacle to a Soviet-U.S. accord."

"Of course we are disappointed," Doctor R.O'Neill, director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, said in a conversation with us. "I fear that the unsuccessful outcome of this meeting could cast a shadow over the current disarmament talks. Reagan declared that he would never agree to any restrictions on the 'Strategic Defense Initiative' he has put forward. Even though the word 'never' is perhaps inappropriate in serious politics. We obviously must wait and see how events will develop in the future."

Literally a few minutes before filing this dispatch we were sought out by Y. Niidzuma, Moscow bureau chief of the Japenese newspaper ASAHI. "I honestly tried, " to find any somewhat coherent assessments of the results of the Reykjavik meeting in the statements by U.S. figures. All I found was total confusion -- not to put it more bluntly by saying a void. A really purposeful and highly convincing analysis of what happened here can be found only in M.S. Gorbachev's statements. I admire his political daring and clarity of view of world problems. Listening to him at the press conference I felt as if the Soviet and U.S. leaders, like mountain climbers, were ascending a very high, steep peak. They had climbed almost 90 percent of the mountain when one of the climbers found himself short of breath. I would like to hope that, having gained this experience, the Soviet Union and the United States will resume the climb and will conquer the peak whose name is nuclear disarmament and security throughout the world."

Ptashnikov: 'Meeting Not Fruitless'

LD131155 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Special correspondent Andrey Ptashnikov from Reykjavik]

[Text] The conversations on 12 October between Comrade Gorbachev and President Reagan lasted almost to the end of the day. At the very last moment, the time limit for the meeting was changed: instead of a previously planned three rounds of talks over the 2 days, a further extra round took place. This further heightened the already great interest in the press conference by Comrade Gorbachev, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which was held immediately following the conclusion of his conversations with the U.S. President. And this was the first opportunity in 2 days to find out how the conversations went, whether the participants had reached agreement, and whether any rapprochement between the sides had been achieved on the most important issues in the modern international situation.

The Central Hall of Reykjavik, where the press conference took place, was full. By the time you hear this dispatch, comrade listeners, you will already know what Comrade Gorbachev said. The progress of the discussions that took place once again confirmed that Washington officialdom as before does not intend to give up implementation of its aggressive star wars doctrine, and is striving any way it can to obtain military superiority over the USSR. The United States, as Comrade Gorbachev emphasized, came to Reykjavik empty-handed, and a lack of new ways of thinking could clearly be felt during the course of the talks.

Important accords could have been achieved in the Icelandic capital on key questions of halting the arms race and cutting nuclear arms. The USSR delegation did all it could to achieve this. A whole series of new constructive proposals was put on the table; not only was flexibility displayed but also a readiness to compromise, and even significant concessions. So the meeting at Reykjavik was not after all crowned with the success which was expected from it. And yet the current, extremely complex and tense international situation demands urgent, decisive and, most important of all, joint efforts by states to rid mankind of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

Can the Soviet-U.S. working summit meeting in Reykjavik be called absolutely fruitless? Of course not. Because the exchange of opinions took place after all, and, as Comrade Gorbachev emphasized, this meeting showed that the need for dialogue has grown even further, no matter how difficult it might be.

Lomeyko: 'Important Insights'

LD131217 Hamburg DPA in German 1104 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 13 Oct 86 (DPA) -- Even if in the absence of an SDI compromise no new rapprochement of the two great powers was feasible, the meeting at Reykjavik provided important insights. To this assessment of the meeting in Iceland, Vladimir Lomeyko, the Soviet special ambassador, added the expectation that in principle the conclusion of disarmanent agreements was also possible separately from an SDI solution.

Lomeyko, former head of the press department at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated at a press conference at the Soviet Embassy in Bonn:"was not in vain."

It had led to a comprehensive exchange of opinions, which had brought about more clarity on both sides. To repeated questions as to whether in particular the elimination of medium-range missiles was still possible, Lomeyko answered emphatically, yes. The Soviet diplomat, who had been taking part in an international conference in Hamburg, also underlined Soviet readiness for a zero solution on medium-range missiles in Europe. After this offer from Moscow, however, the United States had set new conditions, including the demand to be able to keep "several dozen" medium-range missiles in Europe.

Lomeyko explained the strict rejection of the U.S. concept of missile defenses in space (SDI) by the Soviet conviction that SDI would help the United States toward military superiority. Reagan had evidently "not been able to give way," said Lomeyko, who regarded the U.S. President as some kind of prisoner of the military and of interested industry: The "working meeting" at the Icelandic capital had nevertheless passed off as "interesting and promising."

Vinogradov: Peace Efforts Continue

LD131456 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Commentary by Academician Vladimir Alekseyevich Vinogradov]

[Text] Soviet people, and possible the majority of people on earth, welcomed the new Soviet initiative which led to the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan Reykjavik.

Yes, this meeting really was capable of providing a new impulse to reducing international tension. The Soviet delegation arrived at the meeting with constructive and far-reaching proposals which envisaged a reduction of strategic missiles by 50 percent, the complete destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe, and much else.

However, President Reagan was unable to relinquish imperial ambitions, the desire -- even in conditions of nuclear disarmament -- to secure for the United States superiority over the Soviet Union by way of developing new weapons and deploying then in space within the framework of the so-called SDI. It was this also which determined the outcome of the talks.

There is no doubt that all people of good will on earth are disappointed and concerned with such an outcome. The entire blame for this lies with the U.S. Administration. One cannot disarm with one hand and prepare new weapons with the other. Such a policy is unacceptable.

We hope that common sense and also the hopes of the American people will exert an influence on the U.S. Administration and that the accords which did not come about in Reykjavik will find their substance in Washington. After all, the question of new meeting and the continuation of the talks has remained open.

At the press conference which we watched and heard on central television and radio, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stated that despite the unsatisfactory results of this meeting, the Soviet Union will in no way slacken its struggle for peace, for averting the nuclear threat, and expressed certainty that this noble desire is supported by the peoples of all countries. We scientists fully share this position and will do everything we can for the triumph of peace on our planet.

Chernyshev: U.S. 'Space Rush' Specter

LD131503 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 13 Oct 86

["Washington's Ghosts Over Reykjavik" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 13 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The working Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik threw unusually bright light on the tenacious imperial ambitions of the U.S. ruling circles. A historical possibility to achieve breakthrough in every area of the struggle for the limitation of nuclear weapons and truly to avert the threat of nuclear war, the possibility which became tangible thanks to the vigorous and constructive stand of the Soviet side, which put on the table a package of new proposals, was missed. The "ghost" of the American President who said way back at the dawn of the space age that he would dominate space, would dominate the world clearly prevailed over the U.S. delegation in Iceland. The spectre of a chase for military superiority through "technological edge" was looming large over the Reykjavik meeting.

Washington's "space rush" called to mind the age of the "gold rush," when there were no constraints or sense of reality.

The Soviet leader told the U.S. President: If you want so much to know that SDI can give you we ar not against your conducting research and testing in laboratories during the next 10 years. It seems a reasonable and constructive proposal. But the administration is not happy even with this. It wants a completely free hand to make preparations for the militarization of space. It does not want to think what political risks this policy is fraught with.

And these risks are very grave. First, the threat of the placement of weapons in near-earth space would cause obvious uncertainties in strategic planning, which would fuel mutual mistrust. Each side would worry all the time if the other side is not overtaking it in any way. This situation could lead to decisions which would have very grave consequences for the cause of peace. Second, in this situaton one could hardly imagine any cuts in or even limitations of the strategic offensive weapons. To agree to this would mean to improve the efficiency of the first-strike potential developed under the guise of an "anti-missile shield," that is, to play into the hands of the side which is planning to "overtake" you by relying on space systems, new "superweapons."

Third, SDI work could lead to breakthroughs into entirely new types of weapons and start a qualitatively new arms race with all the pernicious consequences for mankind. fourth, SDI would lead to the dramatic aggravation f the accidental outbreak of war as a consequence of an error, miscalculation or technical malfunction in sophisticated computer systems.

As for those for whom the arms race is today's Klondike, those who would not give up the will-o'-the-whisp of military superiority, unattainable today, would not reckon with today's realities or future dangers to civilization, time is inexorably running out. The world as a whole was given another chance to see that the "star wars" apologists are nostalgic for the past.

Mankind is imperatively demanding a cure for this chronic disease. It is only after such therapy that the accords outline in Reykjavik can be translated into reality.

Grigoryev: SDI Allies' Disappontment

LD131757 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 13 TASS -- Political news analyst Aleksey Grigoryev writes:

Hope gave way to disappointment. The meeting in Reykjavik between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and the President of the United States Ronald Reagan brought both sides to a line where there had existed a full possibility of concluding large-scale agreements in the field of reducing and subsequently eliminiating nuclear arms. The possibility, however, did not become reality. Why?

Several quotes to begin with. "How can one for the sake of the SDI let slip chances of considerably reducing nuclear arms? The President should have known that his rejection of the Soviet proposals would cause a serious conflict with allies..." (the West German KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER); "Reagan did not even try to alter his 'principled' stand on the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative" (the Japanese MAINICHI); the talks in Reykjavik ended in failure when President Reagan refused to waive his support for the "star wars" programme (the London FINANCIAL TIMES). These are eloquent quotes from West German, Japanese and Italian [as received] newspapers, that is newspapers of those three countries which together with Italy have joined the United States in preparing for "star wars". The notorious SDI, which became the stumbling block at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik, might well become a similar stumbling block in Washington's relations with its allies.

It is an open secret that the leading firms, say, of the FRG or Japan, with the exception perhaps of Messerschmit-Belkow-Blom and Hitachi, are in no hurry to join the implementtion of the SDI because they see in this programme not benefits but danger to themselves. "The hopes of seven-digit orders within the framework of SDI have turned out to be a soap bubble", it was openly stated recently by the weekly WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, a publication of West German business circles.

It is indicative, however, that even in the political circles of the FRG, which in their time had been in an obvious though sometimes artificially generated euphoria about the American offers, a certain sobering up is beginning lately.

It is not by chance that the West German Minister of Economy Martin Bangemann, who signed the common agreement on the SDI in the American capital this spring, bitterly complains now about "Washington's bad policy". Have we really signed the agreement on SDI only to get after that a kick in the back? This statement, as reported by WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, was made by a West German politician who is very close to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The ruling conservative-liberal coalition in the FRG will now have to admit also the fact that the SDI, which has Bonn's official support, torpedoed not only the success of the Soviet-American meeting as a whole but also the fulfilment of the Soviet proposal to liquidate the American "Pershings" and cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe. But it is exactly the solution of this problem that Bonn had publicly proclaimed a vital necessity on the eve of Reykjavik. Appearing in the West German ARD Television Prgramme, deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party of German Horst Ehmke stated that on October 12 "the upper hand was taken by those politcal forces in the United States which do not want results in the field of disarmament".

This is so. But Sunday, October 12 can also be called a moment of truth which demonstrated with maximum clarity what new politcal thinking is and what the old confrontational mentality is.

Fesunenko: 'Conflict' Plaguing Reagan

LD132240 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2035 GMT 13 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenko]

[Excerpt] Good evening, comrades! The course of the meeting in Reykjavik has proved true the analysis by James Reston, eminent U.S. journalist and NEW YORK TIMES political observer, who wrote a few days prior to its opening about dramatic contraditions and the conflict plaguing President Reagan who, as Reston wrote, was in the crossfire of the opposition to his meeting with the Soviet leader. Indeed, the U.S. President found himself not up to the mark in Reykajvik; he failed to place himself above dated concepts, above the plans to gain an unilateral military superiority, which have been refuted by life itself.

In short, the President failed to display a truly new political vision which would be in line with the present-day situation. That is the reason for his uneven, illogical, ambiguous behavior at his meetings with Comrade Gorbachev. When his interlocutor made concessions, when Comrade Gorbachev went for a reasonable compromise, for example, regarding our decision to accept the zero option on the medium-range missiles in Europe, the U.S. President expressed his readiness for an accord. But when he had to traverse his half of the way, and also do something concrete and significant in response to the Soviet proposals, President Reagan forgot the elementary rules of international talks calling for tolerance, a mutual understanding and readiness to go for a compromise. One tends to think that the chief reason for the meeting in Reykjavik not being successful lies precisely in that. As a result, it appears that the U.S. side has punished itself. [passage omitted]

USSR Pozner: Flexibility Shown

LD141044 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 14 Oct 86

[From the "Tonight" program; commentary by Vladimir Pozner]

[Text] Thank you and hello. Reykjavik is over. The initial emotional reaction to what it failed to achieve must be one of disappointment. With a breakthrough in sight, the U.S. refusal to honor the antiballistic missile, or ABM, treaty of 1972, proved to be an insurmountable barrier. Never before has a chance of a major success been so real. The Soviet Union has come to Reykjavik determined to achieve major steps in arms reduction. A determination reflected in its proposals.

Proposal No. 1: An across the board 50 percent cut in offensive strategic nuclear weapons, that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched missiles, and strategic bombers. Proposal No. 2: An accepting of the original U.S. zero option proposal on intermediate-range missiles, which would mean destroying all Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, but not counting or limiting the French or British missiles. Also the Soviets agreed to freeze their Asian intermediate-range missiles to 100 warheads.

Both of these proposals were major concessions on the Soviet side. As a third part of the package the USSR proposed that the ABM Treaty be given iron-clad guarantees for a 10-year period, during which time the proposed cuts would be made.

Also during that 10-year period the United States must limit its work on SDI to laboratory research and testing, that is, it must not go into space. And that is what President Reagan refused to do. And that is why the historic agreement that was within reach at Reykjavik eluded us.

Hence the emotional reaction I alluded to, disappointment. But emotions should not be allowed to carry the day in such a crucial area of U.S.-Soviet relations. What happened in Reykjavik demands calm, serious and profound analysis. One must ask oneself: Why did the Americans refuse to compromise, refuse the slightest concession, when by doing so they could have achieved what they have for so many described as (?their) most fervent desire -- to get deep cuts in Soviet heavy ICBMs and rid Europe of Soviet SS-20's? Those heavy SS-18's, with their 3,000 warheads (?had) always been a number one on the American list of security concerns, and here was a concrete chance to see them cut, at first 1,500 warheads, and eventually zero.

In view of that, even SDI becomes a strange notion. What would it be defending the United States against in the absence of Soviet offensive strategic nuclear weapons? Yes, that question must be asked, and seriously analyzed. The answer may be deceptively simple. Namely that the military-industrial complex and the U.S. Administration do not really want deep cuts or disarmament. What they want is to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, and what they have been led to believe is that the goal can be reached.

That belief has been implanted by CIA assessments of the Soviet economy and bolstered by the way U.S. think tanks have chosen to interpret Soviet readiness to compromise. Namely, as a sign of how badly the Soviets need some breathing space from military production to improve their economy. Thus the U.S. reaction, let's not give (?in). That is what Reykjavik means, at least to this observer.

Should one be disappointed? Well, not really. Reykjavik showed the world exactly where we all stand, who wants what. It showed us who is flexible and who is not. It set off the difference between traditional patterns of thought and a new approach to the whole complex of international relations. It showed that real and very substantial agreements can indeed be achieved and reached provided the desire is there. So, in an important sense Reykjavik showed an alternative, like a curtain that suddenly lifts and offers a glimpse of beauty previously only imagined. It displayed what we can really achieve, we, the people of the world and the governments that do our will. That in itself is not an insignificant result.

Druzhinin: U.S. Can 'Reconsider'

LD141633 Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Our commentator Aleksandr Druzhinin takes a look at the results of the Reykjavik summit:

Time is the most precious asset in a nuclear space age, the time still left to stop the slide towards a nuclear catatastrophe, to start eliminating the stockpiles of weapons capable of killing all life on this planet. This is the reason why all countries are unanimous that at the Reykjavik summit a historic chance was missed. A major opportunity to start practical disarmament was not used.

There is no doubt that such an opportunity did exist. Mikhail Gorbachev suggested a 50 percent cut in all components of the strategic triad -- that is, ground-launched missiles, submarine-launched strategic missiles, land nuclear-capable strategic aircraft. He also suggested removing both American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe and the retention of British and French nuclear forces. The United States some time ago put forward the same idea, calling it zero option. The Soviet Union has now accepted it. It said once again that it would agree to any form of verification. It said it was prepared to enter into negotiations on the missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers and on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Washington has often referred to disarmament as a bargain. Well, using the terminology of the American Congressman Edward Markey, the United States could strike the best-ever bargain offered by the Russians. However, the bargain did not materialize. Politicians and the press have been unanimous in pointing to the unwillingness of the Washington administration to abandon the Star Wars program as the only cause of this. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India has said that concrete results in the field of disarmament were blocked by plans for taking the arms race to other areas, a clear reference to space. American Senator Claiborne Pell has deplored the fact that the administration sacrificed cuts in strategic arms to the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Austrian news agency says Washington's position on the issue of Star Wars was the main obstacle that prevented agreement.

One cannot but subscribe to such opinions. Genuine disarmament cannot be achieved if outer space remains open to weapons. There is no sense in shutting the front door while keeping the back door open. As he spoke on television after the Reykjavik summit, President Reagan justified his position by claims that the SDI is the insurance policy that guarantees America's safety. But aren't major arms reductions suggested by the Soviet Union at Reykjavik the best guarantees of one's security? Such reductions would make a space shield unnecessary. That Washington continues insisting on its illogical claims is evidence of its intention to seek military supremacy over the USSR, to deploy strike weapons of mass destruction in space. President Reagan in his address in effect confirmed this. He said that the United States would achieve progress in disarmament only if it relied on force. This is a dangerous delusion testifying to the lack of new political thinking. (?To rely on force) is only going to boost the arms race. It is not force but reason that can pave the way for disarmament, and the Soviet Union proceeded from this when it initiated the Reykjavik summit.

The profound understanding of today's realities prompted the USSR to advance proposals which Mikhail Gorbachev said meet the interests of the American people and the people of all other countries. As for Washington, it still has the time to consider what it lost in Reykjavik and what road it should take to remove the threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over the world before it is too late.

Levin: Offer Still 'In Force'

LD141827 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 14 Oct 86

["Latest News" commentary by Viktor Levin on President Reagan's address to the nation on the Reykjavik meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev]

[Text] The fact that specific accords were not reached in Reykjavik, although they were within reach until the United States, by sticking to SDI, prevented them, caused a sense of disappointment.

But one's attention is drawn to the fact that at Reykjavik the Soviet Union proposed a whole range of solutions that meet the innermost desires of the people. Let us recall what the Soviet Union is proposing: First, to reduce its strategic weapons by 50 percent, to reduce by half each unit of strategic offensive armaments; second, to completely do away with the American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe; third, while doing away with the American and Soviet missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union is agreeable to leaving 100 warheads on its medium-range missiles in Asia, and the Americans the same number on their missies of the same type on U.S. territory; fourth; to strengthen the timeless ABM treaty in order to establish a guarantee that neither side secretly prepares or takes the initiative and achieves military superiority; fifth, to commence talks on a ban on nuclear explosions; sixth, the Soviet Union has reaffirmed its readiness for any form of monitoring and this has been done so convincingly that the question of monitoring, which has for many years been the subject of political speculation in the West, is removed.

These proposals remain in force. They are not being removed, for they untie the bonds which even yesterday many thought were bound fast. The world is once again convinced that our country is not merely declaring the need for a new way of thinking, but is showing an example of how to turn this idea into practical deeds that meet the supreme objective -- the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war.

It must be said again that the Soviet Union's readiness for sensible compromises -- concessions on vital details, even -- in the interests of reaching agreements of principal importance created a strong impression. So, when speaking of strategic armaments, we have removed the question of the American medium-range missiles in Europe and have removed the question of forward-based facilities. In examining the question of medium-range missiles in Europe, we have decided to put aside the nuclear potential of France and Britian. We have also shown a readiness for concessions over the question of ending nuclear tests.

Why are we doing this? Because we must get things in motion. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized that bold, imaginative solutions are required. We are proposing such solutions. The more the world thinks about them, the more actively it will support them.

COMPARISON OF GORBACHEV NEWS CONFERENCE IN REYKJAVIK

Moscow TASS in English at 0724 GMT on 13 October carries the news conference by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev given in Reykjavik, Iceland on 12 October. This version has been compared with the Moscow PRAVDA 14 October version published in the 14 October Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, beginning on page DD 42. The two versions are virtually identical. However, Moscow TASS in English at 2253 GMT on 13 October transmitted a service message correcting this TASS English version of the news conference. The TASS correction differs from the PRAVDA version as follows:

Page DD 46, paragraph four, line two reads in TASS: to take another constructive step to meet. (adding word 'constructive')

Page DD 47, penultimate pagragraph, line one to page DD 48, paragraph two, line one reads in TASS:

But who will agree to this? [new paragraph] And then it turned out that we were about to take most important history-making decisions, inasmuch as until now the previous agreements -- ABM, SALT-I AND SALT-2 -- dealt only with a limitation of arms, and now it was to be a considerable cut. But since the U.S. administration, as we have once again convinced ourselves, is out, coming to believe in its technological advantage, to break through via SDI to military superiority, it has gone to burying these almost concluded agreements, on which we already reached understanding. It only left to us to draw up treaties and outline the procedure for their practical implementation. And all that could be signed during my visit to Washington. The U.S. side has wrecked that decision. [new paragraph] I told the President ... [rewording].

Page DD55, paragraph eight, last line to end of paragraph nine, TASS reads: a major step. [new paragraph] Yet at the same time we told the Americans that we were concerned too, since a larger part of the strategic forces of the USA is deployed in submarines. There are nearly 700 missiles with almost 6,000 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. But submarines are known to plough the seas and oceans around the Soviet Union, where from are they [as received] going to launch a strike? This is no less dangerous than heavy land-based missiles. [rewording]

U.S. HOUSE WITHDRAWS ARMS CONTROL AMENDMENTS

LD111137 Moscow TASS in English GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 11 TASS - By TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev

The House of Representatives has bowed to White House pressure and struck off four of the five amendments on arms control it earlier included in a bill on federal spending in fiscal 1987, House Speaker Thomas O'Neill told a news conference here Friday.

The Democrats in the House dropped their demands for a ban on nuclear tests involving explosive devices with an yield of more than one kiloton and for mandatory compliance with the SALT-2 limits.

The congressmen also withdrew their objections to the start of the full-scale manufacture of a new kind of chemical weapons, binary munitions, and sanctioned the production of 155-millimeter artillery shells staffed with the deadly mix.

Besides, they agreed to increase appropriations for "star wars" to 3.2 billion dollars.

The only amendment left intact prohibits testing anti-satellite weapons against a real target in outer space but does not limit the scale of work under this program.

CHERNYSHEV ASSAILS U.S. ARMS UPGRADING PROGRAMS

PM131017 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Military observer V. Chernyshev "TASS Commentary for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "The Pentagon's Quest for Superiority]

[Text] The U.S. Air Force has announced that the first of 50 of the latest B-1B strategic bombers deployed at the Dyess Air Force base (Texas) has been put on standby alert. This is yet another indication of the Pentagon's unwillingness to take any practical steps to promote an atmosphere of mutual restraint in the sphere of strategic offensive arms limitation. Washington has not curtailed or amended in favor of limitation a single one of its military programs. On the contrary, a comprehensive program for a massive arms buildup in all the components of the U.S. strategic triad -- new ICBM's, missile-carrying submarines, and heavy bombers -- has been drawn up and is being implemented. Ground-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles are being manufactured and deployed.

It is planned, for instance, to deploy before the end of the year 10 first-strike MX missiles which possess enhanced accuracy and a tremendous destructive force; 130 B-52's have been adapted to carry cruise missiles; and work has begun on the modification of the 131st such aircraft to make it capable of carrying cruise missiles. If this delivery vehicle is added to the arsenal it will mean the violation of the SALT II Treaty. In August this year the U.S. Navy took delivery of the eighth Trident class nuclear submarine and the ninth missile carrier is to be launched in November. Five more submarines of this class are being built at shipyards. This year 8 surface vessels and 15 submarines are to be equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles; as a result of this the total number of U.S. floating cruise missile carriers will double in comparison with the current level and, as a spokesman for the U.S.Navy frankly declared in congress, "the number of targets on USSR territory that the United States will be able to hit will increase substantially.

All this amounts to material preparations for a world war which are taking place at a scientifically and technically new level of the arms race and in the presence of colossal arsenals of weapons capable of wiping out our planet's civilizaiton in a matter of days. Such are the military and political practices and the level of responsibility of the people who regard the arms race as a gold mine, the people who refuse to give up their illusory dream of military superiority which is fraught with danger for the whole of mankind, and who are trying to destroy the strategic parity between the USSR and the United States which is the basis of stability in the world. Their actions are fraught with serious consequences for international security.

And how is one to interpret the following facts, for instance: A few hours after the announcement of the Soviet-American accord to hold a summit meeting at Reykjavik, another explosion of a U.S. nuclear device was carried out at the Nevada test site -- the 21st such explosion since the announcement of the unilaterial Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions; furthermore, another, the fifth, test of an ASAT antisatellite system has been carried out. It is quite obvious that such steps are hardly likely to contribute to a climate of confidence and cooperation between our countries.

This policy has been described by T. Hoopes, former assistant secretary of the U.S. Air Force, as provocative and damaging to the United States itself. One can only agree with this assessment. A historic opportunity now exists for a substantial improvement in the relations between the USSR and the United States, prospects have opened up for the conclusion of practical agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction. However if the course dictated by the U.S. military-industrial complex continues to be pursued, then this opportunity will be lost.

IGNATYEV ON U.S. EDITORS' DISINFORMATION PROTEST

LD121147 Moscow TASS in English 1034 GMT 12 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 12 TASS -- by TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev:

The American Society of Newspaper Editors has sent a telegram to President Reagan to protest the use of "disinformation" tactics to mislead public opinion in the United States and elsewhere.

The society said it "has examined evidence that senior officials of the Reagan administration have been involved in an incident to spread 'disinformation' regarding U.S. policy toward Libya". The editors said they were outraged and alarmed with "this calculated technique of falsehood".

The principal ways and means to be used in this effort have been defined in a secret memo by the President's national security adviser John Poindexter, which has provided for using "real and illusionary events -- through a disinformation campaign" to undermine the positions of the Libyan leadership.

THE WASHINGTON POST said editorially that "the government actually conveyed to reporters things it knew to be false".

The scandal over the exposed disinformation campaign has demonstrated for an umpteenth time that Washington uses slander and falsehood as a tool in its government policy.

TEXT OF PRAVDA COMMENT ON KALB RESIGNATION

PM101449 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Gan "Commentator's Column": "On the Question of Morality"]

[Text] Washington -- B. Kalb, assistant U.S. secretary of state for public affairs, has just announced his resignation. It follows from his explanations that in doing this he wanted to express his disagreement with the actions of the administration, which has recently been publically accused of spreading lies and disinformation and of manipulating the U.S. press. "I was faced with the choice of either submitting without a murmur, or declaring my protest by resigning," Kalb declared.

Commenting on this step by the U.S. State Department's chief press officer, the newspapers are writing about a crisis of confidence in the words and actions of Washington officialdom.

This is not a new issue. Washington "moralists" who are fond of lecturing other countries and peoples on any pretext, and often even without a pretext, stand accused of spreading flagrant lies. This is what happened also on this occasion. In its efforts to kindle anti-Libyan hysteria as a backing for its agressive actions against Tripoli, the Administration did not stop at deliberate deception. The press was fed purposeful disinformation from "reliable sources" claiming that Libya was planning a campaign of terror against the United States which allegedly necessitated retaliatory measures from the United States.

Leading newspapers and television networks all pounced on the confidential "information" obtained as a result of a "leak." It may be assumed that people in the White House were rubbing their hands with glee: The plan for subversive anti-Libyan actions against Tripoli, drawn up by the National Security Council, was going ahead at full speed. However, a few days ago THE WASHINGTON POST got hold of documents which indicate that it was a question of unscrupulous deliberate disinformation whose purpose, according to the newspaper, was to undermine psychologically Al-Qadhahafi's leadership of the country and to prepare the ground for his physical removal. At the same time the Pentagon as instructed to subject Tripoli to "military pressure." At a secret conference in the White House, THE WASHINGTON POST wrote, the intense "hatred" of Libya's independent policy obscured all other considerations, that is considerations of morality and of the elementary ethics of interstate relations.

The newspaper report had a bombshell effect in the United States. The sense of outrage of the duped "free press" knew no limit. Its indignation is understandable, but it would not be the first time if, after the dust has settled and heads have cooled down, everything returns back to normal. It can hardly be otherwise in a society where the powers that be have always had two yardsticks for morality: One for themselves (anything is allowed) and one for the rest (only what is sanctioned on the banks of the Potomac is allowed).

IZVESTIYA ON GROMYKO TALK WITH LOCKSHIN

PM121505 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 2

[Text] Moscow October 10 TASS -- Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, President of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Andrey Gromyko received in the Kremlin on 10 October American biochemist-oncologist Arnold Lockshin. He and his family were granted political asylum in the Soviet Union.

Arnold Lockshin touched on the causes of his decision to come to the USSR. He disagrees with the U.S. Government's home and foreign policies and he had come to the conclusion that the forces which are shaping the country's policy course do not express the interests of the American people, and serve big business alone. Suppression of human rights, unrestrained armed races are the idols to which these forces have sworn allegiance.

It is not the American people's fault that such a situation now exists in the country. The American people strives to live in peace with other nations, including the Soviet nation and does not want to perish in a nuclear conflagration.

The scientist and his wife started expressing in the United States their critical opinion of the American Government's actions many years ago in conversations with friends and through the press, at meetings and other public forums for peace and elimination of nuclear weapons.

They protested against the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, declared against the present administration's policy which refused to take steps to end the arms race. The Lockshins became convinced that their way differs from that of people who are pushing the world to a nuclear catastrophe.

The husband and wife were subjected to persecution, unseemly methods of baiting and blackmail in letters and telephone calls; acts of vandalism were used against their property, even threats to do away with them were made -- in short, unbearable conditions were created for them in the country which the authorities boastingly call democratic. U.S. special services were undoubtedly behind the slander in mass media, behind all attacks and victimization, Arnold Lockshin believes.

Andrey Gromyko said the Lockshin's sentiments and thoughts are fully understood in the USSR. They took a step prompted by conscience and provided a convincing explanation for its motives. This a stern reproach to those who deprived them of the possibility to exercise their inalienable right to live freely and to work together with their people. Soviet people applaud the courageous deed made by Doctor Arnold Lockshin and his family who are now among friends. The peace-loving Soviet people invariably entertains good sentiments for the American people and wishes to maintain friendly relations with the United States.

The meeting passed in a warm atmosphere.

D.D. Venediktov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union of USSR Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, was present at the conversation.

IZVESTIYA NOTES END OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

PM141736 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Political Consultations"]

[Text] Beijing, 14 Oct -- The ninth round of Soviet-Chinese political consultations was held in Beijing, 6-14 October.

During the consultations I.A. Rogachev, special representative of the Soviet Government and USSR deputy foreign minister, and Qian Qichen, special representative of the Chinese Government and PRC deputy foreign minister, continue the discussion of questions concerning the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. The two sides exchanged opinions on the condition of ties in the political, trade, economic, cultural, and other areas, and also on some important international and regional problems of mutual interests. Both sides reaffirmed their sincere desire to futher improve and develop relations between the two countries.

Agreement was reached to resume the Soviet-Chinese border talks at deputy foreign minister level in Moscow in February 1987 and to conduct them in the capitals of the two countries in turn.

The consultations proceeded in a businesslike and frank atmosphere.

The sides consider that the consultations and dialogue were useful and agreed to hold the next round of consultations in Moscow in April 1987.

CONFERENCE DEDICATED TO SUN YAT SEN CONCLUDES

LD151043 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 14 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] A scientific conference dedicated to the 120th anniversary of the birth of Sun Yat Sen, prominent Chinese revolutionary, ended in Moscow today. A group of prominent Chinese scientists took part in the work of the conference. One of them, a prominent historian (Lu Dan Yan), gives an interview on celebrations in China of Sun Yat Sen's birthday saying that an international symposium is to be held this year. He concludes that "China and the Soviet Union have achieved great successes in broadening scientific cooperation and I think that both your and our scientists, both China and the Soviet Union, are interested in such cooperation."

SOVIET AMITY GROUP LEAVES FOR CHINA TOUR

OW110621 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China 0400 GMT 9 Oct 86

[Text] In accordance with the provisions of a cooperation plan between the friendship societies of the Soviet Union and China, a tour group from the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Other Countries and the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society left Moscow for a visit to Beijing on 8 October. The tour group, led by composer (Ulunker), includes Soviet Cultural activists, musicians, and film and stage workers. Before their departure on 24 October, they will visit Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Xian, and Chongqing.

SOLDIERS BEGIN SCHEDULED WITHDRAWAL FROM DRA

CPSU Sends Greetings

PM191549 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 86 First Edition p 1

[Text] To the servicemen-internationalists returning from the DRA.

Dear Comrades! We warmly greet you, glorious sons of the homeland! You are returning home having fulfilled with honor your international duty in the land of friendly Afghanistan.

At the request of its legitimate government, you soldiers of peace, like your friends in combat who earlier completed their military service in the DRA have helped the Afghan people to defend its independence and freedom and the gains of the national-democratic April Revolution; and to ensure the firm security of the southern frontiers of our fatherland.

Soviet servicemen, together with Afghan soldiers and all the country's patriots, have resisted and continue to resist courageously the armed aggression of hostile forces which have encroached upon the sovereignty of the Afghan state. Risking your lives every day, you warrior-internationalists have saved thousands of Afghan children, old people, and women from the bloody violence of hired killers and terrorists and have made it possible for children to go to school, for peasants to reap their harvest, and for workers to labor at their machines. This feat will forever remain a symbol of Soviet-Afghan friendship. Officers and men, doctors and nurses have carried out their duty selflessly and continue to do so.

Years will pass, but they will not erase from our memories the names of Nikolay Chepik, Aleksandr Mironenko, Nikolay Anfinogenov, Gafir Namazov, Aleksandr Stovba, Vyacheslav Gaynutdinov, Aleksandr Oparin, Zurab Chlachidze, Aleksandr Demakov, Edmuntas Shakinis, Georgiy Demchenko, and all those who have carried the honor and dignity of the Soviet servicemen.

Soviet people bow their heads in memory of the courageous sons of our homeland who have fallen in battle: they mourn together with those who are close to them, their relatives and friends. It is the duty of every party, trade union, and komsomol organization, of the soviets of the people's deputies to surround their families with solicitude and attention and to reduce the pain and grief of their loss for them.

During the bleak days of trial in combat you have learned to value more highly the brotherhood of servicemen and to hold dear the homeland and the loyalty and devotion of loved ones. You have come to know even more deeply how excellent our fatherland is, how one must love it wholeheartedly and defend it reliably.

While in Afghanistan you have become convinced of the fact that the class enemy hates fiercely everything of which we are proud: freedom and equality, culture and democracy, the happiness of all working people, the international brotherhood of the peoples. It it had its way it would sow the same hatred and malice in our land, too, he same grief and tears that it has brought to our southern neighbor.

Soviet people have experienced this for themselves during the years of the great patriotic war.

You, dear comrades, have been brought up by our revolution, by the party and by the komsomol. Patriotism and courage, bravery and the honor of the soldier have been inherited from your fathers and grandfathers, the older revolutionary generations. From the very first days of its creation the workers' and peasants' Red Army was an army of internationalists. It has borne these traditions through the crucible of the severest trials. Soviet servicemen will always be true to them.

The motherland receives you, her dear sons, warmly and heartily. Our country is now living through an interesting and a stern time. A revolutionary process of deep renewal is taking place in all spheres of life. The political and combat tempering that you have acquired will help you to worthily perform your duty as servicemen and as citizens and to make your own contribution to the solution of the great tasks that face the country.

Our ideal is a lasting peace and reliable security for all peoples. Under conditions in which imperialism continues to threaten the security of the socialist fatherland, of our allies and friends, and to interfere without ceremony in other people's affairs, however we have to be on our guard, and of course the Soviet Union will not leave its neighbor to its misfortune so long as armed interference from outside continues in the affairs of democratic Afghanistan.

In continuing your service, always remember that you are soldiers of the fatherland and must be ready to perform feats of arms and of labor.

We wish all of you who have worthily performed your international duty or who are now performing it, happiness, fresh successes, glorious achievements. The homeland is proud of you. The homeland thanks you. The homeland counts on you!

Kabul Press Conference

LD142306 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Unscheduled report by Farid Seyful-Mulyukov on 14 October news conference with recorded marks by Shah Mohammad Dost, DRA foreign minister; Lieutenant General Mikhail Sotskov, representative of the USSR Defense Ministry; and General Azimi, representative of the DRA Defense Ministry; in Kabul, in the presence of Afghan and Foreign Journalists; Dost remarks in Dari with superimposed Russian translation; passages in quotation marks recorded; video shows speakers on platform]

[Text] Journalists and television reporters from many countries have gathered these last few days in the capital of Democratic Afghanistan. There are about 100 representatives of the world's press, television, and radio. It is an important political event which has brought them here -- the return home from Afghanistan of six Soviet regiments, which starts tomorrow.

Foreign correspondents will have the opportunity to see for themselves, to describe and to take photographs of how the departure of the Soviet internationalist troops, soldiers of peace, who came to the assistance of the friendly Afghan people in a difficult period of their history, is carried out.

To tell about the true situation in Afghanistan, about the noble mission of the Soviet soldiers and officers -- that is the purpose of this news conference. It is being conducted by Shah Mohammad Dost, foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; Lt Gen Sotskov, a representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and General Azimi, a representative of the Afghan Ministry of Defense.

Comrade Dost opened the news conference. He said, in part:

[Dost] "The Soviet units were invited to Afghanistan by the government of the Democratic Republic in accordance with the treaty of friendship between our countries and the norms of international law. The time has now come for a part of them to return to their homeland, to the Soviet Union, to places of permanent distribution.

"The organizers of the news conference hope that it will help the world's public to assess on merit the peace-loving steps of the USSR which are being taken on International Peace Year."

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Next to speak was Lt Gen Sotskov.

[Sotskov] "Our principled approach to the situation surrounding Afghanistan was set out in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and summarized in the speech by Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the party Central Committee, to the working people in Vladivostok in June this year.

"The return of a part of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan has become possible due to the process of gradual political stabilization of the situation in that country. The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are acquiring combat experience in the course of the operations to liquidate the counterrevolutionary gangs. At the present moment they are carrying out combat operations independently. Large-formation gangs have been smashed and their bases have been destroyed in a number of provinces in the country.

"At the same time, the armed resistance of the counterrevolution has still not been broken. The imperialist circles and regional reaction are making attempts to halt the process of normalization. They are involved in an escalation of hostile actions against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Military and financial assistance to the counterrevolutionary organizations has increased. They are whipping up an anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet campaign.

"Instead of taking any countermeasures, at least by some limitation of its external interference in the affairs of the DRA, the Reagan administration is now doing everything to belittle the significance of the withdrawal of part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

"In making the decision to return part of its military contingent from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is suggesting that it will facilitate the creation of a favorable political climate surrounding the Afghan-Pakistani talks, which are being held in Geneva through the mediation of representatives of the United Nations, and the achievement of specific accords at these talks.

"The complete return of Soviet troops from Afghanistan may be effected with the consent of the government of that republic on condition that there is an end to and a nonresumption of foreign aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

"In making the decision on the return of six regiments from the complement of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in the DRA to their homeland, the Soviet Union also proceeds from the fact that those who are organizing and carrying out the armed intervention against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will correctly understand and assess in a proper manner this step which we have taken. The response to this should be the curtailment of external interference in the affairs of Democratic Afghanistan.

"However, as Comrade Gorbachev stated, those who encourage and finance the undeclared war against Afghanistan from the territory where this is being waged should know that if the intervention against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan continues the Soviet Union will not abandon a neighbor to its misfortune.

"Our international solidarity with the Afghan people, like the interests of the security of the Soviet Union, absolutely rules this out.

"Tomorrow the Soviet command begins the withdrawal of named regiments from the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The timing and stages of their withdrawal have been agreed with the Afghan leadership."

[Seyful-Mulyukov] The organizers of the news conference then replied to many quetions from foreign journalists. The representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense assessed thus the recent statement by Pentagon chief Weinberger, that allegedly several weeks ago the Soviet Union brought additional subdivisions into Afghanistan:

[Sotskov] "Once again I say that the Soviet Union has not brought any additional military subdivisions into Afghanistan, neither recently nor at any other time. There is no basis at all for Mr Weinberger's statement, which one can assess precisely as the latest attempt by the United States to find a new pretext for stepping up interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and also to wreck a political settlement of the situation surrounding that republic. In conclusion, I would like to recall that as early as 1980 a certain proportion of the limited Soviet contingent was returned to the homeland."

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Responding to the question of what assistance the Soviet subdivisions give to the Afghan government troops, Lt Gen Sotskov said:

[Sotskov] "This assistance is diverse. At the request of the Afghan military command, individual subdivisions of the limited contingent of Soviet troops give necessary assistance in carrying out combat actions against the bands and formations which are sent in from the territory of Pakistan and Iran. They provide assisatance in guarding communications and important economic facilities.

They take part in mine-clearance from the roads, fields, and residential areas. They accompany convoys of national economic freight for the population of remote areas of the republic. Alongside the Afghan troops they defend peaceful kishlaks against dushman attack. Finally, they are handing on to the Afghan troops their combat experience, helping in the organization of combat training, and give any other necessary assistance, naturally."

[Seyful-Mulyukov] A correspondent from the AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE asks, how can you prove that the Soviet units being withdrawn from Afghanistan will not be replaced by new ones?

[Sotskov] "Well, as you know, the Soviet Union has always been, is, and remains true to its word. All the regiments being withdrawn will be sent to the places of permanent garrisoning in the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts, from whence they came to the territory of the DRA. The national means of monitoring, which are in existence, can easily check on this. All the more so in that we have no intention of disguising the regiments' return to the motherland."

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Answering a question on the reaction to the Soviet-Afghan initiative of those who are conducting an undeclared war against Democratic Afghanistan, Comrade Dost said:

[Dost] "Unfortunately, our jointly-agreed constructive initiatives have still not found the correct understanding and response on the part of those to whom they are addressed. But we are optimists; as the popular wisdom has it, what is done with patience is not done by war."

[Correspondent Leshchinskiy -- asking question from floor] "In accordance with the coordinated decision by the DRA and the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments is beginning. What specific steps can be expected in this direction?

[Sotskov] "As you know, it was announced from the platform of the 27th CPSU Congress that the Soviet Union is ready to return the troops which are in Afghanistan, at the request of that country's government. Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared in Vladivostok that even the dates for a stage-by-stage withdrawal of these troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have been agreed with the Afghan side.

"Unfortunately, the United States of America and other capitalist states have no interest in reducing the acuteness of the situation surrounding Afghanistan and they are basically afraid of any weakening in their positions in the Middle East. The U.S. Administration is even worried about the political reverberation, so to speak, evoked in the world by the decision of the Soviet Government, together with the DRA government, to withdraw six regiments and return them to the Soviet Union.

"Therefore, propaganda measures are now being taken which are directly aimed at neutralizing the effect of this new peaceable Soviet action. A sober evaluation of the situation demonstrates that issues relating to Afghanistan can be resolved only by political means. And as you see, in all respects the Soviet Union acts in precisely this manner."

Najibullah Interview

OW141414 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1110 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Moscow Television correspondents Farid Seyful-Mulyukov and Mikhail Leshchinskiy studio interview with General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee Najibullah in Kabul -- recorded; date not given]

[Leschinskiy] In your opinion, of what significance is the Soviet concept of universal security for the peaceful normalization of regional conflicts, in particular, of course, of the situation around Afghanistan?

[Najibullah in Dari, fading into Russian translation] We studied with great interest the latest statements of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which contain global initiatives aimed at strengthening peace. A comprehensive program for transforming international relations can be clearly seen in these documents. In the Soviet proposals there are questions that are particularly close to the people of revolutionary Afghanistan. They touch on ways to ensure security in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area. We understand the concept of universal security as respect for sovereignty, independence, and a respectful attitude toward lawful governments and international obligations and agreements.

It is not hard to see that regional conflicts are born in the very same offices where plans for nuclear wars are worked out. Neoglobalism is becoming increasingly dangerous and it is striving to restructure the world along its own lines. Here the creation of a system of universl international security which organically includes measures for liquidating regional conflicts, is of enormous significance. The problems that have accumulated around Afghanistan can be solved only be peaceful means.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Comrade Najibullah, how is the forthcoming return home of part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops viewed in the DRA? I would like to know your point of view.

[Najibullah] The people of the DRA perceived with deep understanding the statement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Vladivostok about the return home of six Soviet regiments. I would like to emphasize that the corresponding agreement on this issue was achieved between the governments of our countries. Therefore, this decision was adopted jointly. Under current conditions, the Central Committee of the PDPA concentrated all of its efforts on strengthening the country's armed forces and sealing off [prikrytiye] the border with Pakistan and Iran, from which gangs of Dushmans penetrate into our territory.

Speaking about the feelings experienced by the Afghan people over the forthcoming return home of part of the Soviet troops-internationalists I would like to stress the following: Possibly the most precise words in connection with this would be gratitude and confidence. Your great people extended their hand of assistance to us at the most difficult time in our history. We will always remember the feat of the Soviet troops-internationalists who helped defend the freedom, independence, and territorial integrity of Democratic Afghanistan. The withdrawal of part of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan attests to the fact that our people and their revolutionary forces are acquiring increasing capability to defend the gains of the April Revolution and to defend the borders of our country from the armed aggression of hostile forces. Our Soviet friends teach us to feel confident how to win. Now confidence is the path to victory.

[Leshchinskiy] What is your opinion about the present military and political situation in the country?

[Najibullah] I can put it briefly: Better than at any time during the entire period of undeclared war against Democratic Afghanistan. How can I confirm this conclusion? During the past 5 months nearly as many soldiers and officers joined our army as were previously called up during an entire year. The combat might of the Armed Forces of the DRA is growing, border troops have been established and they defend our border with increasing reliability in the east and southwest, and finally major military operations carried out by the Armed Forces of the DRA in the regions of Khowst, Herat, and Kabul Province have literally shaken the gangs of dushmans.

We know that the counterrevolution is no longer what it was and there is increasing pessimism and discord in its camp. The primitive slogans prepared for the Afghan revolution abroad no longer work. People are people and they see where the real power of the people lies and where there is play acting, a falsification of people's power. That is why more and more gangs lay down their arms and increasing numbers of refugees return to their native hearths. We do not want vengeance, we want peace, but we will not beg for it from our enemies; we stand firmly on our feet.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] In connection with what you have described, I would like to share just one impression of our film crew during a visit to one of the fronts of the undeclared war. A few days ago when combat operations of DRA Government troops were under way against bandit formations, we found ourselves in the region of Shakar Darreh. We saw the matured combat skill of Afghan soldiers and officers, their accurate strikes against dushman machine gun nests, and we saw the dushmans resort to the most base methods to cause panic among the population and to cause damage.

Now I would like to continue our conversation and ask the following question: Comrade Najibullah, how is the present course of the PDPA concretely manifested in expanding the social basis of the April Revolution and in achieving national reconciliation? Please.

[Najibullah] As you know, after the 16th plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, representatives of more than 100 different levels and groups of the population were brought into the Revolutionary Council, government, and other organs of power. Two-thirds of them are nonparty members. A vivid example of the broadening social basis of our revolution were the elections to local organs of power.

They are not afraid of the bandits' bullets, they are not afraid of hostile voices, and they are building a new life. At the 19th plenum of the PDPA Central Committee the membership of the Central Committee was almost doubled by the inclusion of workers and peasants -- secretaries of provincial committee. Steps were also undertaken to unite with other leftist democratic parties and organizations. The dialogue with those groups that still inadvertently occupy positions hostile to the April Revolution and with those that have already expressed regret for their counterrevolutionary activities has also expanded.

Presently talks are being held simultaneously with more than 100 groups and gangs. We are for reasonable compromises in the name of national reconciliation, in order to ensure security and peace for our people. Our appeal is finding broad support among the people. In the near future there will be a session of the All-Afghan Commission for National Reconciliation which will adopt extremely important documents.

[Leshchinskiy] Comrade General Secretary, to conclude our meeting and discussion, permit me to ask you how you see the future of your motherland, the DRA.

[Najibullah] The development of the national democratic revolution is a historically lengthy process. We inherited criminal illiteracy of the population and social backwardness. In order to take the path of material and spiritual progress the purposeful work of our party and all the people is essential. It is necessary to this end that all questions be resolved in a spirit of trust, cooperation, and fraternity.

Of course, far from everything is going like we would like it to, but the revolution is alive, struggling, and winning. This is now an irreversible process. When one thinks about the future of the DRA, then first of all one thinks about the words found in our party documents. We swore to make our people free and our country prosperous. But the path to all of this lies through the most rapid end to bloodshed. The future of the DRA lies in the vivifying and constructive friendship with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community; and I am confident that this friendship must also be established with our other neighbors. Our people have made their choice, forever, for ages.

[Leshchinskiy] Thank you very much.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Thank you very much for your interesting story.

Ivanovskiy Interview

DW141410 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 14 Oct 86 pp 1-2

[Werner Holzer article: "No Further Troop Withdrawals Planned"]

[Text] Moscow, 13 October -- In an exclusive interview with FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, the U.S. television company CNN, and Finnish television, Army General E.F. Ivanovskiy, deputy Soviet defense minister and supreme commander of the USSR ground forces, reaffirmed past Soviet Afghanistan policy.

The withdrawal beginning on Wednesday of 3 air defense regiments, 2 armored infantry rifle regiments, and 1 armored regiment -- altogether roughly 8,000 troops -- will be terminated by the end of October as planned. General Ivanovskiy did not hint of any major reduction of Soviet armed forces, and he was also not prepared to disclose data on the total number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, which is estimated at 110-115,000 men.

In the interview, which came about at the Soviet Union's suggestion, the general once again quoted in detail Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of 28 July when the Soviet party leader announced the withdrawal of 8,000 men. U.S. statements, including that by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in Beijing at the end of last week, that the withdrawal was of little real value because Moscow had previously reinforced its military presence or could send its troops back to Afghanistan at any time, were called "a lie" by Ivanovskiy. They showed, he said, that Washington had no interest in "reducing tension."

According to the general, the six regiments envisaged for withdrawal were deployed in the Afghan provinces of Kabul, Baghlan, and Herat, as well as in another province. Because there were no railroads in Afghanistan, the Soviet units would use their own means of transport.

Regarding the Soviet units' military tasks, the general also made only very general statements. "Some of them" helped to protect traffic routes and economic installations, as well as the civilian population. Some of them fulfilled air-defense tasks. Because the Afghan guerrillas have no aircraft or helicopters, it was not clear what the general could have meant by that.

Like Gorbachev before him, the minister also stated that the withdrawal was decided upon following consultations with the Afghan Government. The country's new army was now "so stabilized that it can take over the tasks of the withdrawing troops," he said. The Soviet Union viewed its decision as "an act of good will." If the situation were to normalize further, "the Afghan army" would some day be able to "cope with internal unrest by itself."

However, in Ivanovskiy's view a prerequisite for that is "that counterrevolution is no longer supported from outside." In the past such support had been given through the supply of increasingly modern weapons by a number of countries and through the training of guerrillas in Pakistan and Iran, he said. By referring to "modern weapons" the general probably addressed the fact that Afghan resistance for some time has been supplied with U.S. "Stinger" type surface-to-air missiles.

The general said that a prerequisite for a political solution to the conflict was "the discontinuation of support" for the insurgents, who, in his view, are nothing else but "gangs threatening the people's lives, production, and the transport system." It was a "war of bandits," he said, and they were nothing else but "mercenaries fighting for money."

Asked how the Soviet Union assessed the religious motives of the Mujahidin partisans, Ivanovskiy answered that he did not see such motives. The USSR had no problems with religions, for example, Islam, he said. He also refused to accept the term "partisans" and kept to the term "bandits" who were "exaggerating the religious problem toward other countries." Their objective was "destruction of democratic power in the country and restoration of a feudal system."

The general concluded the interview with a request for objcetive reporting, after having made it clear once again that "the withdrawal beginning now is possible because the situation is more stable. However, if a new situation were to arise," Ivanovskiy added, "we will not let our friends down."

WEINBERGER CONTINUES TOUR OF ASIAN COUNTRIES

LD111228 Moscow TASS in English 1204 GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] New Delhi October 11 TASS -- U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, currently on a tour of Asian countries, arrived in India today for an official visit.

The TIMES OF INDIA newspaper, commenting on the Pentagon chief's trip, said that India would use the opportunity for expressing to the U.S. its concern over the large-scale arms deliveries to Pakistan that were heightening tension in the region.

Talks With Gandhi

LD111828 Moscow TASS in English 1810 GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] New Delhi October 11 TASS -- Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India has received U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger who arrived here today for an official visit. The PRESS TRUST OF INDIA reports that bilateral talks, which continued for one hour and a half, covered a wide range of matters. The international situation, as well as matters concerning security in the subcontinent and the transfer of the newest technology were considered in particular.

Arrives in Pakistan

LD142052 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 14 TASS -- As is reported by the UPI, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger arrived in Pakistan today. In the opinion of political observers, his negotiations with President Ziaul Haq and other Pakistani leaders will be focused on questions of consolidating the American-Pakistani military-political alliance and expanding the undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan being waged by the United States from Pakistan's territory. The UPI recalls that this is Weinberger's second trip to Pakistan in the past three years.

As "tradition" has it, the chief of the Pentagon will also visit camps of Afghan counter-revolutionary scum making bandit raids on Afghanistan's territory.

Pakistan is the main U.S. military-political ally in South and Southeast Asia. In exchange for Islamabad's participation in the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Washington supplied Pakistan with big consignments of up-to-date armaments, including 40 F-16 nuclear-capable fighter-bombers. In the course of the visit, the UPI points out, details of a new American-Pakistani agreement on a more than 4,000 million dollar military and economic aid, which is to come into effect in 1987.

PRAVDA VERSION OF HONECKER MOSCOW SPEECH 3 OCT

PM091259 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Oct 86 First Edition pp 1-2

[Address by Erich Honecker, SED Central Committee general secretary and GDR State Council chairman, at a ceremony in Moscow marking the unveiling of a monument to Ernst Thaelmann -- live]

[Text] Dear Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Dear Friends and Comrades, Dear Muscovites: For us German communists, today is a moving day. We are happy to celebrate this day together with you, dear Muscovites. The inauguration of this worthy monument to Ernst Thaelmann is a vivid expression of the unshakable bonds linking the SED and the CPSU and the GDR and the USSR in the struggle for peace and socialism.

It was Ernst Thaelmann, who continuing great revolutionary traditions, very early saw the Soviet Union as the first country in the world to open up an untrodden field for a better future of mankind by abolishing the exploitation of man by man and by building a socialist society, a country, which, on the basis of its new social order, would develop into a bulwark of peace and progress. With this monument, the life and work of a great man and revolutionary are honored for whose freedom the masses of the people rallied in every world capital between 1933 and 1939, and whose thought and action even today 42 years after his cold-blooded assassination by the fascist butchers exert profound influence in our struggle for peace and socialism.

Ernst Thaelmann, the great son of the German nation and ardent internationalist, was very closely connected with Lenin's Party and the country of Red October, as we all know. He devoted all his life to implementing the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, ideas which have changed the world. He remained true to that noble cause until his death. In jail, a shining symbol of resistance against the criminal Hitler fascism and the criminal fascist regime, he wrote that communism is the doctrine of the liberation of the working class. But the liberation of the working class is the liberation of all people. I am proud of having fought for it all my life.

We are absolutely correct in stating that Ernst Thaelmann's legacy has become reality in the GDR, the first worker-peasant state on German soil. The social system is definitely firmly rooted here. The seed of liberation, sown by the victory of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, has borne fruit. In the 37th year of the GDR's existence, our people shape their lives and future with clear success. Friendship with the Soviet Union has become a matter that is dear to our people's hearts.

Dear Comrades: Our 11th party congress, at which we were pleased to welcome you, dear Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, outlined further perspectives to shape the developed socialist society in our country further. Those resolutions the continuation of our course of the unity of economic and social policy, closely linking economic performance with improvement in the material and cultural living standard create an inspiring atmosphere throughout the country. Much has been achieved. By the end of August alone, the income rose 4.3 percent, while the original cost in industry decreased 2 percent. More than 90 percent of the increase in national income was achieved through an increase in labor productivity, meaning by using the most modern technologies.

However, we are not satsified with that. We are starting to tackle new, bigger tasks in the economy, science and technology, as well as in education and culture. [paragraph continues]

In daily political discussions with the working people, and by including them on a broad basis in the implementation of our policy, our party releases creative forces and at the same time strengthens its close trusting relationship with the people.

"Participate in work, planning, and management" -- this principle permeates our people's creative work in building a developed socialist society.

The chief content of our economic strategy designed to take us through the year 2000 is the further deepening of production intensification and the combining of socialism's advantages with the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. Economic growth and higher labor productivity must increasingly be the result of using modern, progressive technologies. It is a question of securing on an increasingly large scale progressive achievements that are competitive on an international scale. Scientific and technical progress under socialism must always be linked with improved living and working conditions. We are guided by this in our work.

If we ponder the requirements and tasks facing the socialist community as a whole and each one of its members, it becomes clear that the GDR's cooperation with the USSR must also be raised to a new level. On the basis of the stable and dynamic development of the GDR's national economy this cooperation is developing particularly widely in the economic, scientific, and technical areas.

It is known that since 1949, the USSR has been the GDR's most important trading partner. Our country also ranks first in the USSR's foreign trade. According to our long-term agreement for the period 1986-90, our mutual goods exchange will amount to more than R82 billion. That is the largest agreement even concluded between two countries. The long-term program to develop our cooperation in science, technology, and production for the period until 2000 is of special importance. It is indispensable tc find the most effective way to implement it. The GDR will continue conscientiously to fulfill the joint accords and make its active contribution toward opening up new opportunities for cooperation.

Dear Friends and Comrade, Dear Muscovites: With its resolutions on the acceleration of the Soviet Union's socioeconomic development, the 27th CPSU Congress, which I had the honor to attend, initiated a stage of great, revolutionary, creative work. The Soviet Union's material and intellectual potential will grow to an enormous extent. That serves the Soviet people's well-being and is at the same time of great importance for strenghtening the international positions of the Soviet Union, and even all world socialism. We wish the communists and all Soviet working people great success in the further implementation of the policy laid down by the 27th CPSU Congress.

We are honoring Ernst Thaelmann's legacy primarily by doing everything in our power to safeguard a secure peace. In his time, Ernst Thaelmann passionately warned that those who voted for Hitler were voting for war. The World conflagration started by fascism brought immense suffering to the peoples. When it was over and the brown plague was eradicated, we vowed that we would not rest and would continue our efforts for the lasting preservation of peace. We vowed that war would never again he started from German soil. Since the day it was founded, the GDR has stood for that, and it will continue to struggle for it.

Today, given the danger of the nuclear self-destruction of mankind, peace is more vital than ever. We struggle for it alongside the Soviet Union. [paragraph continues]

Through its untiring constructive initiatives it has rendered the peoples' interests and immeasurable historic service. We fully support the many various proposals submitted by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the interest of our common ideal -- a world without war and without weapons.

The complex program jointly announced by the Warsaw Pact Countries in Budapest on nuclear and conventional disarmament, dialogue, the return to detente, and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation of all countries is for us, too, the basis of our practical action. Beyond all that which separates us, we are ready to cooperate with anyone showing common sense and realism and pursuing equal goals.

Our people assess the forthcoming meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan in Iceland's capital as an event of extreme importance for further international development. We welcome the meeting, which came about at Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal, and hope that constructive decisions will be reached allowing steps in the direction of disarmament and detente. The example set by the Soviet Union by the repeated extension of its moratorium on nuclear explosions has encouraged peace forces in the world. They demand all the more emphatically that the United States also renounce further nuclear tests.

No new mass destruction means, an end to the arms race on the earth and its prevention in space, concrete disarmament steps, not confrontation but cooperation -- those are our maxims. Peace, peace, and again peace!

Dear friends and comrades, dear Muscovites: On this memorable day when we are honoring Ernst Thaelmann, and at this powerful meeting, at which we reaffirm our fraternal ties, I say:

Long live the great Soviet people!

Long live the CPSU, its Central Committee and its General Secretary, Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev!

Long live our common cause of socialism and communism!

Long live the struggle for peace!

YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN TRADE PROTOCOL REPORTED

PM130935 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS dispatch: "Yugoslavia-Albania"]

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Oct -- A protocol has been signed here between the SFRY and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania on trade exchanges in 1987. According to TANJUG, the value of reciprocal goods deliveries is to total 126 million dollars. Yugoslavia will supply Albania with ferrous metallurgy goods, finished metal articles, various types of equipment, consumer goods, and food. Albania will deliver electricity, chromium, bitumen, and consumer goods.

PONOMAREV: FRG POPULACE OPPOSES U.S. MISSILES

LD111624 Moscow TASS in English 1558 GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 11 TASS -- By TASS commentator Leonid Ponomarev:

The number of U.S. nuclear-tipped medium-range cruise missiles deployed in West Germany keeps growing. An official spokesman for the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Friedhelm Ost, told a news conference in Bonn Thursday that a first batch of such missiles had already been stationed in that country and was in operational readiness. The weapons systems in question make up the 1st missile squadron of the 38th Tactical wing of the U.S. Air Force. Work is now under way to install cruise missiles at a base in Hasselbach, Rhineland-Pfalz.

All in all, 96 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles are to be sited in West Germany in addition to Pershing-2s of which, according to DER SPIEGEL magazine, a total of 156 are already on station.

Broad sections of the German population are protesting the presence of the American nuclear missiles in their country. Protest rallies and marches and other actions such as blocking approach roads to the bases where the weapons are deployed have become part of a nationwide anti-nuke campaign which has continued without a letup since late 1983 when U.S. nuclear missiles began to arrive in West Germany.

A major demonstration for peace, disarmament and an immediate withdrawal of American nuclear missiles from West Germany, for example, is planned at Hasselbach today. According to reports from there, it started with anti-war campaigners forming a ten-kilometer human chain around the U.S. military base. Their demands, inscribed on their streamers, are that all U.S. nuclear missiles be removed from West Germany and that the FRG renounce participation in U.S. plans to militarize outer space.

The concern of the West German people is quite understandable. The movement of these missiles forward to the European theater has worsened the political climate on the continent and increased the danger of war considerably.

A halt to all nuclear testing in the world would be a real step to reducing East-West tension. The peace champions in West Germany, including those attending the rally at Hasselbach, and in other West European countries stand strongly for ending all nuclear blasts on earth.

Silence at the testing ranges would be a good prerequisite for general detente and for an atmosphere of trust.

FURTHER REPORTS ON GROMYKO-ALFONSIN TALKS

TASS Details 14 Oct Talks

LD141650 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1535 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 14 Oct (TASS) -- Talks were held today in the Kremlin between A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Raul Ricardo Alfonsin, president of the Argentine Republic.

The Soviet side informed the guests of the large amount of work in hand in the USSR to implement the program for accelerating the country's socioeconomic development outlined at the 27th CPSU Congress. The president of Argentina discussed the activity of his government to resolve the socioeconomic problems of his country in the modern era.

The sides expressed concern at the tension in the world. Profound anxiety is being caused by the stepping up of the arms race and attempts to transfer it into space. The participants in the talks emphasized that at the present time the main task is to keep the world from slipping toward nuclear catastrophe and to turn the threat of war away from mankind.

A.A. Gromyko drew the attention of the Argentinian president to the large-scale peace initiatives of the USSR, which are set in the decisions of the 27th party congress and in the statements of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, including the program for full elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and creation of the all-embracing system of international security.

President Alfonsin expressed the positive view of Argentina toward the Soviet peace initiatives and above all toward the proposal concerning the creating of a nuclear free world by the end of the present century. He stated that Argentina is devoted to the policy of peace and disarmament. The guest highly appraised the USSR's decision to extend the moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987. In Argentina's view, this responsible step was made in the interests of strengthening international peace and the Soviet Union's example must be followed by other nuclear powers.

In connection with the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, the sides expressed the joint view that the USSR and the United States will continue to bear a special responsibility for acute and unresolved problems. The participants in the Soviet-Argentinian talks expressed confidence that the Reykjavik summit had undoubtedly shown that at the present time the need for dialogue, no matter how difficult it might be, has increased still further in order to achieve agreements on key questions of international security, in order to improve the situation throughout the world.

The participants in the talks drew attention to the important role of the Nonaligned Movement in warding off the threat of war. A.A. Gromyko and R. Alfonsin noted that peace can only be preserved and strengthened by vigorous actions on the part of all states and all peace-loving forces. In this respect the Soviet side stressed the constructive endeavors of Argentina and other states belonging to the "Group of Six", who are actively working to preserve peace.

Deep concern was expressed at the heightened tension in Latin America. The problems of this region can and must be settled peacefully by the Latin American countries themselves, without any interference from outside. The Soviet side expressed support for the efforts of the participants in the Contadora process and other peace-loving countries to attain a political settlement in the region.

The participants in the talks expressed support for proposals that the South Atlantic be declared a zone of peace and cooperation.

The USSR and Argentina confirmed their full commitment to the United Nation's aims and principles. They declared their support for the United Nations which is an important instrument for the preservation of peace and the solution of many acute international problems.

The course of the talks confirmed that the attitudes of the sides to the majority of current, topical problems which were discussed were either close or identical.

There was a constructive exchange of views on the state and further development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina. It was stressed with satisfaction that in recent years bilateral ties have reached a high level and are in the interests of the peoples of the USSR and Argentina. Soviet-Argentinian relations are an example of cooperation between states with differing social systems, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs. They are becoming increasingly diverse and intense. The participants of the talks emphasized the great importance of supporting and activating political dialogue in order to strengthen trust and mutual understanding in bilateral relations.

The sides agreed that the strengthening of mutually advantageous trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and Argentina, meaning a firm, long-range basis, corresponds to the priority directions for the development of the economy of the two countries.

Contacts in these spheres will be helped by the forthcoming staging of a national exhibition of the USSR in Buenos Aires, which will be organized in the near future, and by the next session of the joint Soviet-Argentinian commission on trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

The participants of the talks noted the widening of the contacts and exchanges in the sphere of culture, arts, cinematography, education, and sports, which further promote mutual familiarization of the peoples of the two countries with the achievements in these spheres. They reaffirmed the fact that there exist great prospects for the development of cooperation in these directions.

The sides expressed great satisfaction with the positive results of the Moscow talks, which are a most important stage in the strengthening of friendly relations, mutual understanding, and trust between the USSR and Argentina, between the Soviet and Argentinian peoples.

The participants in the talks are confident that precisely this type if international relationship, precisely this way of discussing both global and bilateral questions helps to strengthen universal peace and international security.

Agreement was reached on a joint Soviet-Argentinian statement on the results of the talks. It will be published in the press.

Gromyko, Alfonsin at Bolshoy

LD142213 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report over video]

[Text] This evening Raul Alfonsin watched Adam's ballet Giselle at the Bolshoy Theater. The guest was accompanied in the box by Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko. The national anthems of Argentina and the Soviet Union were played before the start of the performance.

Gorbachev Receives Alfonsin

LD150827 Moscow TASS in English 0811 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin of the Argentine Republic had a conversation in the Kremlin today.

The president arrived in Moscow on Monday for an official visit at the invitation of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

U.S. ON 'ANTI-NICARAGUAN CAMPAIGN' OVER HASENFUS

LD141104 Moscow TASS in English 0638 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Managua, October 14 (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Aleksandr Trushin reports:

Washington has unleashed another anti-Nicaraguan campaign, this time in connection with the case of U.S. military adviser Hasenfus who was in custody in Managua since October 5. That day soldiers of the Sandinist people's army downed a U.S. transport plane C-123 with arms and ammunition for Somozans, which violated the republic's air space. Two U.S. servicemen who participated in the nefarious mission together with Hasenfus, died.

Unable to deny the irrefutable facts of the U.S. direct participation in aggressive actions against the Nicaraguan people, the Reagan administration seeks to smear the Sandinist government, accusing it of "violating rights" of the captured U.S. military adviser. For instance, the U.S. Embassy in Managua which held a press conference last Monday, made slanderous attacks on the Nicaraguan authorities.

Fearing unpleasant questions about the CIA's direct complicity in arms smuggling to Contras and in other secret operations on the Nicaraguan territory, the embassy barred local journalists and correspondents from the socialist countries from the press conference. It has transpired that a spokesman of the U.S. diplomatic mission, cynically haranguing on rules of international relations, tried to justify Hasenfus and bring crude pressure to bear on the Sandinist government. The U.S. diplomat said that an appropriate "note of protest" had been dispatched by Washington to the Nicaraguan Foreign Office.

The U.S. adviser will be tried soon by an anti-Somozan people's tribunal for crimes against the Nicaraguan people, said here O. Cortes, a representative of the republic's judiciary.

GAVRICHKIN NOTES HIGH GRAIN THRESHING YIELDS

PM101421 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Gavrichkin "Agricultural Review": "Stock Units Under Winter Conditions"]

[Excerpt] According to a USSR Central Statistical Administration report, grain and pulse crops (excluding corn) had been fully harvested on 104.9 million hectares by 6 October. Potatoes had been picked on 2.6 million hectares, being 92 percent, and sugar beet on 2.1 million hectares, which represents 62 percent. Raw cotton procurements amounted to 3.4 million metric tons. The winter crop sowing plan had been fulfilled by 86 percent, and the fall plowing plan by 67 percent.

Some 128.7 million metric tons of feeds in terms of feed units have been laid in, which represents 93 percent of the plan.

October is the peak month of the fall. This is the period when basic harvesting work has to be completed. Grain crops, including rice, still have to be threshed on 1.3 million hectares. The last few thousand hectares are being harvested by grain growers in the RSFSR's Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, and Tyumen Oblasts and in Kazakhstan's Kustanay and North Kazakhstan Oblasts.

Despite the acute drought in many regions and the late ripening of grain, this year the fields have produced a pleasing harvest: Average threshing yields have been higher than all previous years except 1978. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes continue to deliver high-quality wheat to elevators. The harvesting of grain corn is nearing completion. In order not to miss the best time, crop farmers have literally a few days in which to complete the sowing of winter crops. [passage omitted]

CSA ON GRAIN FARMERS COMPLETING WINTER SOWING

LD102329 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 10 Oct 86

[Text] The country's grain farmers are completing the sowing of winter grains. According to the latest figures of the USSR Central Statistical Administration 29 million hectares of plowed land are occupied with wheat, rye, and barley, which is 85 percent of the plan. Grain has been sown on every 9 hectares out of 10 in the Russian Federation, which has the most vast winter crop belt in the country. This work has been completed in the farms of the Central, Volga-Vyatka, and Central Chernozem regions, and also in Belorussia and Latvia. Seed drills are leaving the fields of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

BRIEFS

LD090432 NEW WHEAT HYBRID -- Moscow, 8 Oct (TASS) -- Geneticists at Patrice Lumuba University have bred a wheat which yields up to 60 quintals per hectare of grain on medium-fertility soils and up to 90 quintals per hectare under irrigation. The ears are big, with up to 80 grains each, and most of the plants have several dozen shoots, as against the 5 to 10 shoots in the source material. The wheat does not lodge despite the heavy ears. The wheat provides good fodder for cattle; up to 500 and more quintals of green mass can be cropped from a hectare in plantations mixed with vetch. The first practical trials have confirmed the prospects for the new wheat, yielding more than 80 quintals per hectare under irrigation in the Crimea, and over 50 quintals per hectare in Moscow Oblast. [Summary] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0535 GMT 8 Oct 86 LD]